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ABSTRACT

In 2011, a landslide displaced approximately six thousand people from the urbanized
mountain slopes of La Paz, Bolivia. The municipal government of La Paz (GAMLP) managed
the displacement by housing thousands of people in displacement camps throughout the city. By
2013, residents were attempting to return to still damaged lands. This research used participant
observation and interviews with residents over eight weeks in 2013 to address the following
questions: 1) What social, cultural, economic or historic factors influence the settling and then
resettling of at-risk slope neighborhoods in La Paz, Bolivia? 2) What are the most pressing health
needs of people who have returned to slope neighborhoods and people still living in
displacement camps? The research found that the return to at-risk slope properties was supported
by entrenched cultural and social meanings attached to land and home ownership. While scarcity
of resources galvanized communities to pressure authorities with demonstrations and threats, it
also created intra-barrio frictions that disrupted reconstruction, strained existing infrastructure
capabilities and threatened to undermine community health.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Hugo went person-to-person collecting coins for fireworks outside of the municipal water
company. He, along with a hundred other Callapeños, sought to bring attention to Callapa’s need
for potable water service after the landslide. Every few minutes, a firework was shot into the air
and the resounding boom drew attention to the crowd outside the water company’s gates. Hugo
explained, “I have to wait hours to get water out of a locked public faucet! Sometimes it doesn’t
even work! If I can’t get it there, I have to get dirty water from other places. We need water. We
can’t be abandoned like this”. Above him, a banner with President Evo Morales’ face exclaimed
in bold letters “WATER is no longer a private business but a PUBLIC RIGHT for the PEOPLE”.
Below the banner were makeshift signs by those living without regular access to potable water in
the damaged area of Callapa. The signs read “IT IS A CRIME TO LIVE WITHOUT WATER”
and “WATER IS LIFE.” Soon after Hugo collected enough coins, another boom could be heard
over the crowd.
Several weeks later, I walked uphill along one of the unofficial dirt roads of Callapa with
Sigfrido, a Risk Management Supervisor with the Special Directorate of Integrated Risk
Management (DEGIR). Sigfrido was tasked on this day with assessing the relative stability of
several properties. Ahead of us in the distance loomed the clean face of the landslide,
characterized by an almost vertical drop of several hundred feet. Even from miles away, it took a
panning gaze to see the affected slope in its entirety. A single three-story building on the edge of
the drop at the top of the slope looked no bigger than a fingernail. Sigfrido did not notice me
1

looking up at the clean scoop taken from the mountainside. Instead, he took an interest in a patch
of earth. Sigfrido stopped and kicked into the dirt for a few seconds. The spot gave way to a
void, about a foot deep, in the dry and dusty ground. “So much of this hasn’t settled yet. It
probably won’t for years”. Sigfrido points up at the face of slide and says, “That up there should
never have people living there again”
Hugo and Sigfrido stood on opposing sides of a heated debate on resettlement after
disaster. Sigfrido echoed the municipal government’s position that residents should not resettle
areas that were still unstable after the landslide. Reinstalling water services to Callapa, they
worried, could compromise the integrity of already unstable land, encourage further resettlement,
and create seepage. Hugo, along with many others, was already living in Callapa and faced acute
daily shortages of water. The need for water was couched in dialogue of human rights, and drew
upon contemporary themes in national Bolivian politics. The hazards of living in a risky area
were minimized in discussions and replaced with verbiage of ownership and land rights.
Callapeños, as it turned out, were organized and knew how to pressure government officials.
This study explores these two positions further in an attempt to understand if there is
ground to reconcile the public safety needs embodied by Sigfrido and the need for home, place,
and basic needs as represented by Hugo. Specifically, this project documented the motivations
and justifications for the initial settling and subsequent post-disaster resettling of risk-prone
neighborhoods in the slopes overlooking La Paz, Bolivia. The project also aimed to document
any immediate health needs that arose out of the post-disaster circumstances related to
population displacement, resettlement, and relocation. In addition to immediate needs, conditions
that could influence long-term wellbeing were documented. Furthermore, it explored the ways
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that affected communities and government actors negotiated the recovery stage of disaster and
assessed this through the lens of anthropological and public health literature.
Disaster in La Paz
On February 26 2011, a massive landslide destroyed eleven neighborhoods in the
residential mountain slopes overlooking La Paz, Bolivia, displacing approximately 6,000 people
(La Paz Office of the Mayor 2011a). As noted in photos 1 and 2 on pages 5 and 6, the landslide
drastically redefined the slope landscape. The disaster was largely attributed to unusually heavy
rains, unregulated construction, makeshift septic tanks, and overpopulation in historically poor
slope neighborhoods (Eccleston-Brown 2012). The Bolivian government, along with Oxfam
International, Techo, and collaborations with the Spanish and Bolivian chapters of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent (IRCRC), began to assist the residents of the
destroyed neighborhoods. Residents were housed temporarily on school grounds and community
centers. Temporary plywood homes were built on relatively level soccer-fields around the city
(La Paz Office of the Mayor 2011b; La Paz Office of the Mayor 2012).
As the initial shock of the mudslide began to fade, residents began the arduous process of
resettling their properties on the slopes surrounding La Paz. The Bolivian government, along
with the mayor’s office, attempted to prevent further risk by discouraging new and unregulated
construction in the vulnerable slope areas. A plan was proposed that would relocate slope
residents to El Alto, a community 45-60 minutes away.
Some of the affected communities resisted the move to El Alto and expressed concerns
associated with a sense of community (home) and land ownership. Perceived threats to
livelihood included separation from work in La Paz and the way that the additional 1,000 feet in
altitude in El Alto restricts what flora can be grown and what animals can be supported through
3

limited grazing (Eccleston-Brown 2012). The Bolivian government heard these objections and
addressed them by offering residents trade classes, workshops to provide more marketable skills,
and education about the hazards of slope construction (Eccleston-Brown 2012).
Another group actively resisted the relocation and was committed to rebuilding their
homes in the slopes of La Paz. The local government discouraged resettlement of these
neighborhoods, citing the need for geologic surveys and further research of slope stability and
integrity (Eccleston-Brown 2012). These residents petitioned the La Paz government and held a
march demanding electricity be restored to the slopes (La vida continúa en Callapa El Diario
Nacional 2013). In what can be considered a tentative victory for the residents seeking to
resettle, the government of La Paz has allowed reconstruction in specific slopes with certain
restrictions (Perez Medina Personal Communication March 21, 2013). In the meantime,
thousands of other former residents continue to live in temporary housing that is increasingly
inadequate as they pass the third anniversary of the mudslide (El Diario Nacional 2013).
To summarize, when the research concluded in August 2013, those affected by the
mudslide of 2011 primarily fell into one of three groups: 1) those that have accepted government
subsidized relocation to the nearby city of El Alto, 2) those that have tentatively resettled small
portions of the damaged slopes surrounding La Paz, and 3) those that remain in temporary
shelters. This project took place within the areas being resettled and within the displacement
camps distributed around La Paz to more closely examine this moment of transition in the
recovery process and the ensuing health implications.

4

Photo 1 Slope before landslide. Callapa lower right. (Salamanca, et al. 2012)
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Photo 2 Slope after landslide. Callapa lower right. (Salamanca, et al. 2012)
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Goals and Research Questions
My research interests focus on the processes of displacement in urban areas and the ways
vulnerability is manifested in 1) the reasons for displacement and 2) in the attempts towards
recovery. The megadeslizamiento or mega-landslide of La Paz, Bolivia is an ideal case study
through which to examine these research interests. It also offers a timely look into the complex
nature of managing displacement within urban areas. A significant amount of people are still
without homes, refuse to be moved to El Alto, and are adamant about living in slope areas
around La Paz.
From June to August 2013, this project examined the resettlement and relocation of
communities displaced from slope neighborhoods in La Paz. Research was conducted in six
displacement camps and landslide-affected areas where resettlement and reconstruction was
occurring in 2013. The research aimed to address the following questions:
1. What social, cultural, economic or historic factors play roles in the process of initially
settling and then resettling (post-disaster) slope neighborhoods in La Paz?
2. What are the most pressing health needs of a) people that have returned to their homes in
slope neighborhoods and b) people still living in temporary shelters?
The research questions had the following goals. The first was to qualitatively compare the
health needs and health-related experiences of different groups from the same disaster event. The
definition of “health” here encompasses not just biomedical processes, but also larger issues of
wellbeing such as the anxiety, stresses, and risks associated with exposure to hazards;
accessibility of potable water; accessibility to sewage/septic systems; and availability of food. As
a case study, the challenges of the affected populations, as well as the response by local
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governments, hold potential value for other Latin American cities with similar population
densities in slope neighborhoods.
The second goal was to better understand the reasoning behind settlement decisions.
Settling on stable, perhaps more level, ground may appear to be a sound decision, but this is
clearly not the case for many of the displaced residents of La Paz who seek to return to unstable
properties. This research aims to document in more detail motivations and processes for slope
settlement and then re-settlement after disaster, with attention to cultural, social, historic, and
economic factors that may influence settlement decisions. Understanding these motives could
help with outlining future aid strategies.
Embedded in this research aim of social, cultural, historic, and economic contexts are
questions of relationships between authorities and displaced residents. I first heard of the
frictions in post-disaster Callapa in the back of cab in La Paz in 2012. I asked a friend about the
perfect row of shelters we had just passed and would later come to know as the Zenobio Lopez I
and II displacement camps. “Oh those are los desplazados [the displaced]. They were in a
landslide. The government doesn’t want them to go back, but they’ve threatened to blow up a
water pipeline so the government gave in and is allowing them to go back to their land”. The
description was shocking, but hinted at a complicated relationship between citizen and state in a
post-disaster scenario illustrated in public debate and community interactions. The interactions
themselves, documented in the research, were telling of the relationships between community
members in La Paz and municipal authorities.
It was important for me to observe these interactions of a community taking control of its
path in post-disaster reconstruction for my own interests in social movements, popular struggles
and the empowerment of marginalized populations. These interests have led me towards an
8

applied anthropological mindset that researching and understanding cultural, social, economic
and historic nuances can be used in efforts to mitigate ongoing risk by addressing systemic
patterns of disempowerment. Slope residents of unstable, untitled lands are often described as
vulnerable due to their relative socioeconomic status and marginal, extra-legal housing. However
the affected communities’ active and organized political engagement, resistance to government
decisions, and ensuing conflict between community risk and community cohesion suggests more
agency, power, and organization than is usually credited to “vulnerable” populations.
Whatever implicit support I had for the efforts by the displaced to return to homes was
tempered by public health and public safety ramifications of allowing groups to resettle land that
was not yet ready for resettlement. Although it is ideal for a community to be engaged in postdisaster decisions, one cannot predict the nature of this engagement or the direction it will take.
And while, both parties wanted to address the problems in post-disaster Callapa, the organized
community and municipal authorities disagreed on which of those problems were most
important. As a researcher, I approached this topic with the idea that supporting those with less
power was more important, and that telling their story would benefit the overall understanding of
this issue. I understood the long-term needs of preventing risky settlement as expressed by
municipal officials, but chose to listen to the people at risk themselves in order to understand
why they lived where they lived, why they sought to return, and what this settlement and
landslide meant for their health in an attempt to better understand how mitigation strategies could
better serve this population.
Brief Outline of Chapters
This thesis presents the results of the research conducted from June to August 2013 and
concludes with some insights into the post-disaster recovery of the slope neighborhoods of La
9

Paz. The thesis concludes with recommendations for disaster managers and future researchers.
Chapter Two provides a literature review on disaster research in anthropology and public health.
The chapter briefly describes anthropological and public health perspectives on disasters before
narrowing into more specific research on disaster risk, hazards, resettlement, and relocation.
Finally, it will discuss how political economy and structural vulnerability guided this research.
Chapter Three will describe the methodology used, including data collection and analysis.
Chapter Four will provide the results of the interviews and participant observation from June to
August 2013.While many aspects of this research can be articulated individually or as several
descriptive chapters of single pieces of an overall picture, the experiences in the damaged slopes
and camps from June to August 2013 are best told as they played out over a series of events that
culminated into a new post-disaster scenario from only two months prior. Importantly, the
decisions, positions and actions of individuals, groups, and municipal workers are very telling of
the kinds of relationships that have been established in post-disaster Callapa and merit being
described in context. As a result, a significant portion of the results in the following chapters will
be written as an ongoing narrative.
Chapter Five discusses how the themes that emerged from the results are relevant to
anthropological and public health approaches to disasters, and how they can be interpreted
through the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two. Finally, Chapter Six presents
recommendations based on issues in La Paz that could be of value in future disaster recovery
efforts in similar circumstances, directions for future research specific to the La Paz landslide
and in disaster anthropology, as well as limitations to the study.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will review both the anthropological and public health literature that has
informed this project. While the research aims were intentionally broad to account for the
unpredictable nature of disasters and post-disaster dynamics, several key themes emerged from
this particular case that merit review. So while public health and anthropological contributions in
disasters will be presented, the review will also focus on relocation/resettlement literature and the
role of the urban setting in disasters.
Anthropology and Disasters
Anthropologists have increasingly sought out research in disaster settings and along
different points in the life-cycle of a disaster. Anthony Oliver-Smith and Susanna Hoffman have
greatly contributed to the way disaster anthropology is conceptualized and has oriented itself.
Notable concepts include framing disasters as social events, which make clear existing
hierarchies, and that recovery processes often illuminate inequalities through their stated
priorities (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 2002). They have positioned anthropology as paramount in
providing nuanced understandings of local cultures, informing the structure and distribution of
aid, and helping to avoid social tensions that emerge after disasters.
Pre-Disaster
Anthropological discussions in pre-disaster areas have largely focused on vulnerability and risk.
Often, there is an attempt to understand why some people are more at risk than others. Paul
Farmer has notably argued that vulnerability to disease, specifically tuberculosis and HIV, are
11

largely driven by structural factors and poverty that are influenced by neo-liberal economic
policies and international cost cutting measures (Farmer 2005). Others look towards more
localized reasons for vulnerability and how pre-existing discrimination carries over into disaster
strategies. For instance, William Torry discussed how inequality in India, sanctioned by
Hinduism, exacerbated the vulnerability of certain groups over others (Torry 1986). In addition,
changes made to accommodate the circumstances of famine mostly reinforced inequalities
instead of breaking with conventions. Oliver-Smith refers to these as “socially created patterns of
vulnerability” (1999) that are self-perpetuating. This is echoed in Gregory Button’s research on
the politicized uncertainty of post-disaster scenarios. The influence held by those that report
disasters and the many interests groups involved ultimately result in narratives dominated by and
reinforcing hegemonic forces of society (Button 2010; Button 2002).
As Button notes, periods of post-disaster uncertainty can be intentional as they benefit
interest groups that stand to lose power or resources. For example, uncertainty during the Exxon
Valdez spill and the Lucas Oil tank spill after Hurricane Katrina served to deflect blame and
accountability from interest groups that could have been held responsible (Button 2010). An
unfortunate side effect of uncertainty in post-disaster scenarios is that it often undermines
science. Button notes how publics demanding immediate and clear answers are often
discouraged by slow and qualification-laden responses of the scientific community. The lack of
clear answers undermines authority and left residents “disillusioned with the reliability of
scientific evidence” (Button 2010). The result is often an information void that is filled by
corporate or hegemonic narratives.

12

Post-Disaster/Development/Relief
Due to the unpredictable nature of disasters and the often rigid nature of funding
schedules, much of anthropological work takes place in the post-disaster periods of relief,
recovery, and assistance (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, 2002). Here, anthropologists have largely
examined and assessed existing models of development and relief. Critiques have called the mass
of NGOs that descend on disaster zones an “unruly mélange” that should be studied as a culture
onto itself to better understand its effects on local communities (Janes and Corbett 2010).
Importantly, anthropology and public health have contributed to discussions of
resettlement and relocation of displaced populations in urban settings. This is directly related to
this thesis research but also of special importance as it is estimated that by 2050, the world’s
urban population will increase by 72 percent with virtually all the growth expected to occur in
urban areas of non-industrialized countries (Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2013).
As population densities in cities increase, people are increasingly forced to settle and develop
land that serves little commercial value and where chances of eviction or demolition are low
(Charvériat 2000b). Generally these spaces are also the most prone to risk as they often lie in
flood zones or on steep hill or mountain sides. In instances where extreme flooding or mudslides
can affect the lives of entire communities, the responsibilities of the state and the precariousness
of the urban poor come into stark relief, as is seen in the La Paz case.
The urban context of displacement is best illustrated in Colombia, where a decades-long
civil conflict has displaced between 3.8 and 5.4 million people (Castagna and Jeyte 2011). These
internally displaced persons (IDPs) are primarily rural in origin, but between 60% (Carrillo
2009) and 97% (Albuja and Ceballos 2010) of those settle in one of four major cities: Bogota,
Medellin, Cali, and the port city of Barranquilla. Movement into urban areas has made it
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especially difficult in some cases to continue traditional practices which are nested in
contextualized systems of maintaining livelihoods (Carrillo 2009). Tensions in host communities
have been reported as disparities in the attention and resources IDPs receive is felt by locals
(Carrillo 2009; Quintero and Culler 2009). While not as overt as in the Bolivian case described
here, Colombian IDPs have tended to move towards more dangerous slope areas or along the
margins of the urban spaces, where, along with threats of mudslides, they often encounter more
violence and crime due to a lack of formal government or police presence (Sanchez Medina
2010). Internally displaced persons often face difficulties with food security, changes in water
access, and a lack of proper waste disposal. Disruptions of social networks can inhibit typical
health seeking practices and expose many people to marginalized positions that make them
vulnerable to victimization (Cepeda 2012; Lidstone 2007).
Displacement in the urban setting is projected to be one of the more pressing problems
moving forward into the future (Tibaijuka 2010). The increase in urbanization, the movement of
rural people displaced into urban areas, the dangers of population density, and a rise in extreme
weather events all create dangerous scenarios for urban areas in the future (Ferris 2010; Guterres
2010; Tibaijuka 2010; Zetter and Deikun 2010) The United Nations High Commissioner on
Refugees, Antonio Guterres, acknowledged that urban displacement is a unique and complicated
problem for all the many factors that are involved and recommends a dramatic change in the way
it is addressed (Guterres and Spiegel 2012; Tibaijuka 2010).
Relocation and Resettlement/Reconstruction
Post-disaster relocation is often a complicated process with many pitfalls when social and
cultural aspects are not considered. The literature is filled with examples of relocation that did
not account for the way people make a living, the way they perceive their ancestral land, and the
14

way they respond to new housing (Badri, et al. 2006; Boen and Jigyasu 2005; Chan 1995;
Dikmen 2006; Najarian, et al. 2001; Uscher‐Pines 2009; Whiteford and Tobin 2004). Most
notable has been the way that livelihoods have been affected. A series of eruptions and ash falls
near Mt. Tungurahua in Ecuador since 1999 have caused a chronic exposure to not only ongoing
risk, but a debilitating cascade of factors that weakened the local population’s health. Ecuadorian
authorities have sought a long-term solution grounded in resettling the affected communities
away from the threat of volcano and ash (Whiteford and Tobin 2009). A significant challenge
that emerged was the relocation of rural residents into a pseudo-urban setting. However, these
homes were incompatible with the residents’ agricultural means of livelihood (Whiteford and
Tobin 2009). Similarly, after several villages in Indonesia were destroyed by a tsunami, officials
relocated entire communities further inland. Unfortunately, planners did not acknowledge the
depth to which these communities identified with fishing as more than a source of food, but as a
cultural necessity providing life lessons and milestones. As a result, fishing villages were
reestablished on the water and the relocation attempts meant to prevent tsunami casualties failed
(Boen and Jigyasu 2005). These examples mirror some of the dilemmas faced by camp residents
in Villa Salome, who were facing relocation to El Alto, as will be seen below.
Reconstruction is sometimes criticized for the way it can reinforce existing social
divisions (Anderson and Woodrow 1989; Lyons 2009). Those who have access to supplies and
the ability to reconstruct begin doing so. Unfortunately, this has the side-effect of inadvertently
reproducing the pre-disaster community inequalities and hampering development. In addition,
reconstruction tends to imply a specific focus on buildings and homes, without much thought to
long-term sustainability and economic development (Freeman 2004). Reconstruction’s primary
focus on structural repairs ignores the social aspects associated with recovery. However, social
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networks, community cohesion, and social support have been considered as one of the most
important factors in disaster recovery (Aldrich 2012). In La Paz, where community mobilization
and political activism is high (Moseley, et al. 2010), we shall see that these social networks were
re-activated and used to pressure government officials and to dictate recovery.
Theory
Political Economy in Disasters
This research is fundamentally informed by political economy and its view that groups,
their social hierarchies, and quotidian conditions are affected and influenced by intersecting
layers of broader economic flows and political motivations. Political economy can be defined as
“strategies of the governing elite for the maintenance of power by engaging commoner
populations through coherent suites of production/consumption, political focus, and ideological
responsibility” (Blanton, et al. 1996). This is useful for framing social problems and power
within discussions of ascribed values and capital. Political economy can be used at multiple
dimensions to interpret the horizontal relationships that Latin America, Bolivia, La Paz, and its
citizens have with their respective peers and the vertical relationships they have with their
citizens. Broadly, the Bolivian mobilization of aid, the growth of urban areas due to rural-urban
migration, and the settling of unregulated hazardous areas can be seen through a lens in which
broader economic and political forces have the power to develop societal conditions and
narratives.
Vulnerability and Structural Violence
Within anthropology, and particularly in disasters, vulnerability is often cited as a critical
component. The same concept has been articulated within structural violence. While originally
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articulated as a way to differentiate personal violence and larger social injustices (Galtung 1969),
most recently structural violence has been associated in the anthropological literature with the
way health is disproportionately affected in some groups of people by broader social forces;
specifically vulnerability to disease, access to health care and societal perceptions of disease
(Farmer 2001; Farmer 2005; Farmer 2006). For instance, structural violence has been used to
better understand the factors that made the Haiti earthquake such a catastrophe and to dissect the
forces that compelled young Nicaraguans into deadly migration north (Farmer 2012; Quesada
2009). However, it has been noted by Phillipe Bourgois and Nancy Scheper-Hughes that
structural violence is still a concept that needs developing and one that needs to be “elaborated,
complicated and diversified” (Farmer 2004).
The conditions seen in La Paz create an interesting case through which to examine
vulnerability and structural violence. At a macro level, there are political, economic, and historic
forces that contribute to Bolivia’s relative poverty in the Western hemisphere, in much the same
ways that Farmer describes in Haiti: a history of resource exploitation, market changes that
devalue export commodities, and racial politics grounded in its colonial history (Farmer 2012).
This proposed research, however, “diversifies” structural violence by including it in discussions
that pathologize dangerous slope construction as an exposure. Further, structural violence is, to
use Bourgois’ and Scheper-Hughes’ word, “complicated” within a highly politically active
environment and within a culture of activism (Farmer 2004). As structural violence implies a
lack of agency and submission to powerful forces, how does the activism of communities
seeking to reclaim dangerous land fit within a structure that appears to give them little voice and
power? Or as political economy would suggest, is it all part of a system that seeks equilibrium to
maintain a power structure: in this case one with a heavy presence of populist and socialist
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doctrine? The megadeslizamiento, the government response to it, and the community activism
that resulted all have potential for further discussions about structural violence and vulnerability.
Relevant Models from the Field of Disaster Studies
It can be helpful to use Michael Cernea’s Impoverishment, Risk and Reconstruction
(IRR) model (2000) to both succinctly diagnose issues associated with displacement and begin to
frame preventative/resolution-based responses associated with the La Paz landslide. The IRR
model uses historic data to identify eight primary characteristics of displacement common in
development projects and resettlement issues. Along with these, he identifies eight
corresponding resolutions (Cernea 2000 p.3662). Some of the issues, including landlessness of
those with damaged or no properties, joblessness associated with loss of work-related tools or
livelihoods, or community disarticulation resulting from temporary housing solutions and
movements to another city are reflected in Cernea’s model. However, the case of La Paz, as are
many disasters, is complex and multi-layered. The megadeslizamiento may serve as a useful case
study to assess the comprehensiveness of Cernea’s IRR model.

Impoverishment, Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) Model
1a. Landlessness

1b. Land-based resettlement

2a. Joblessness

2b. Reemployment

3a. Homelessness

3b. House Reconstruction

4a. Marginalization

4b. Social inclusion

5a. Food insecurity

5b. Adequate nutrition

6a. Increased morbidity

6b. Improved health care

7a. Loss of access to common resources

7b. Restoration of assets/ services

8a. Community disarticulation

8b. Network and community rebuilding

Figure 1: Cernea's IRR Model
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This research takes a political economy perspective to understand the ways that affected
communities are able to challenge government efforts successfully in post-disaster recovery.
Specific to this case are questions that include: Who exactly are the “governing elite”? What is
the “currency” or resources at play (i.e. land tenure, settlement wave, perceived indigeneity) that
give them power and in what “economy” do they exist to create a framework in which actors
can wield influence, dictate narrative, and play significant roles in their own recovery while still
being vulnerable to the disasters that struck them? Similarly, this research utilized the concept of
structural violence to understand how “violence” can be manifested in a group that appears to
have legitimate agency in their recovery yet that the literature traditionally represents as
disempowered and marginalized.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

Feasibility for this project was established during a five-week research fellowship in
Bolivia from June to July 2012. While there, I met and maintained contact with people affected
by the landslide. Two of the contacts lost their homes, and one was a neighborhood leader
(dirigente de grupo de vecinos) in the destroyed neighborhood of Callapa. In addition, this
research project was supported locally by the Universidad Católica Boliviana (UCB), under the
direction of Dr. Eric Roth Unzueta. Dr. Unzueta offered the full resources of the university in
exchange for a copy of the final thesis for the university library and to make myself available to
students for questions. The university’s recent research exploring causes of the landslide, as well
as active work with the municipal government concerning the mudslide has created a research
infrastructure and a network of people that were available to assist with the project. In addition,
university archives provided access to the three newspapers in La Paz in order to view daily
coverage of the disaster in the local media. Logistical support was also offered by the
international non-profit United4Change Center for International Development and Global
Citizenship (U4C). This organization offered assistance with lodging as well as access to public
health officials within its network, including Dr. Alfredo Calvo, president of the Bolivian Society
of Public Health (SBSP). As an organization wishing to expand its research endeavors,
United4Change asked for a debriefing with recommendations for future areas of focus.
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Research Design
From the first mention of the La Paz landslide in the back of a cab in 2012, it was clear
that the social organizations established in this post-disaster scenario were in need of further
exploration. Specifically, where was the displaced population situated vis-à-vis the municipal
government in this post-disaster scenario in municipal authority could be challenged? This
question required a contextualization, or a starting point, from which to observe further
interactions. I chose to focus attention on those populations displaced by the landslide primarily
for their unique position within the literature as a group vulnerable to a disaster, but empowered
in its post-disaster phase to dictate terms. This research attempts to clarify this position in its first
research aim to better understand the cultural, social, historic, and economic factors influencing
settlement and post-disaster resettlement. While some descriptive characteristics can be gleamed
from survey data, understanding implicit social positioning requires thorough observation of
interactions and triangulation of data. As a result, this research relies heavily on observations
conducted in 2013 over eight weeks in the slope neighborhoods of La Paz and the temporary
housing camps around the city. Meetings were initially arranged with Dr. Unzueta and
researchers at the Universidad Católica Boliviana. In the first weeks of the research, meetings
were also arranged with leaders of the affected neighborhoods that helped to refine my
understanding of the region, guide my access to the affected communities and get acquainted
with key persons.
This first phase consisted of working with established contacts to meet neighborhood
leaders (dirigentes de grupos de vecinos) and municipal contacts and become acquainted with
the larger temporary housing camps. During several weeks of participant observation I attended
community functions, shadowed contacts, and established rapport. During this period, I took
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notes related to water access, waste disposal, and availability of services in the temporary camps
and residences in the slopes. This phase also allowed for a normalization of my presence to
people in urban Callapa and in the camps.
In the second phase, 22 semi-structured interviews were conducted across the six
displacement camps and in residential Callapa. Purposive sampling was initially used to recruit
neighborhood leaders (dirigentes de vecinos) or key figures among those displaced. This
approach to recruiting participants for surveys and interviews was informed by the 2012
feasibility study, during which participants would often ask if the recruiter had already spoken to
neighborhood and community leaders. When we affirmed that we had already spoken to
neighborhood leaders and had gained their approval/favor, respondents were visibly more
relaxed and more likely to be receptive to interviews. In slope neighborhoods and in the
displacement camps, chain-referral sampling was used to gain more interviews but also to
establish an initial foundation of trust from which people could understand my presence was
vouched for by peers. Once that initial foundation was established and my presence was more
accepted, convenience sampling became equally effective at community meetings (asambleas),
around the neighborhood and in camp common areas.
In addition to community members, municipal and aid workers were interviewed to gain
an institutional perspective on the challenges associated with the displacement, community
health and resettlement of the slopes. The interviews consisted of three with camp administrators
of three of the displacement camps, one with a municipal psychologist working in the social
service division of the recovery effort, one with a Red Cross of Bolivia administrator, and one
with a municipal risk management supervisor. These six formal interviews, along with
significant unstructured interviewing during the course of their duties, were intended to
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document any lessons learned, administrative decision making processes or resources needed
from an administrative perspective. While the administrative personnel I interviewed were not
involved in initial decisions regarding relocation, housing, or benefits their perspectives on these
issues were noted.

Semi-Structured Interviews
Displaced Communities
Callapa Camp
Villa Salome Camp
Flor de Irpavi Camp
Zenobio Lopez I
Zenobio Lopez II
Escobar Uria
Residential Callapa
Total
Government/NGO
Camp Adminstrators
GAMLP-UBS Field Staff
DEGIR
Red Cross of Bolivia-La Paz adminstrator
Total

5
6
2
1
0
1
7
22
3
1
1
1
6

Figure 2: Interview Distribution

Interviews were audio recorded and notes were taken during each interview.
Ethnographic field notes were taken daily. At the end of the day, audio recorded interviews were
downloaded onto a password-protected laptop, given an interview code and filed.
Participant Observation
Participant observation was used to better understand the daily realities of the displaced
populations but also to understand how they negotiated a post-disaster landscape that featured
disagreements over resettling damaged lands and multiple social dimensions. As a tool,
participant observation provides an opportunity to document that which is not explicitly stated
and support or refute responses by respondents. Participant observation was a critical component
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of this research. Indeed, observation of events unfolding during the recovery process helped to
more clearly identify social structures in which the displaced were situated. In addition to
supplementing the interview data, participant observation allowed for the building of rapport that
led to respondents speaking openly on sensitive topics including but not limited to: perceived
discriminations, criticisms of political leaders, and grievances about local leaders. This
observation and interaction with respondents allowed for a more nuanced understanding of the
post-disaster landscape that would not have been possible by survey alone. One of these was the
emergence of intra-community frictions exacerbated by return to one’s properties.
Participant observation was conducted in the neighborhood of Callapa and in the six
displacement camps in the eastern slopes of La Paz. In Callapa, participation included being
present for community asambleas, participating in demonstrations, helping to assemble camp
shelters on private property, and helping to draw water from public spigots. As water was only
available during certain hours, residents attempted to fill as many containers as possible when
given the chance. The weight of these containers on mountainous terrain made moving water a
difficult chore, but one in which help was readily accepted and greatly appreciated. The damaged
neighborhood of Callapa offered many more opportunities for participation than were available
in the camps.
The level of participation during the research process can often be affected by the setting
(Bernard 2006; Schensul and LeCompte 2012) . This was especially true in the displacement
camps, where entry was monitored by municipal authorities and activities were more structured.
Much of the daily tasks included washing clothes and cooking. Camp residents, mainly women
and children, spent time waiting for word that they had received relocation benefits to El Alto or
that their land was approved for resettlement. Men spent the days working in other parts of the
24

city and were only available in the late afternoon and on weekends. My own level of
participation then included sitting with residents in informal improvised markets and outside
their shelters. Assistance with washing clothes and helping to carry items around the camp were
less frequent. Careful consideration of appropriate behaviors with married women meant that any
activities with them were always outside and with the understanding that gestures could be
misinterpreted as inappropriate. Interactions with men or gathered families were much more
open and allowed for more observations inside shelters and homes. At a point where many of the
camp shelters had to be quickly disassembled and moved onto private property, participation
included assisting in the disassembly and loading of shelters onto trucks.
Access to the displacement camps required written approval from municipal authorities
in the office of community welfare (Unidad de Brazos Social-UBS) and personal support from
individual camp administrators. As acquaintances were made in the municipal offices, the
opportunity to see the experiences of municipal officials during a time of transition became
available. As a result, I was able to shadow municipal officials for one week as they inspected
private properties for stability, approved lots for resettlement, legally transferred ownership of
the displacement shelters from donor organizations to the families that lived in them, heard
grievances, and addressed a variety of issues within the camps. This also afforded an opportunity
to experience the difficulties that individual municipal workers encounter when faced with the
pressures of people in need and the constraints imposed by superiors and financial cycles.
Semi Structured Interviews
A semi-structured interview guide was developed to collect information on the following
main topics: Demographic Information, Slope Settlement, Disaster, Health, and PostDisaster/Recovery. With the exception of the demographic questions, the interview guide used
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open-ended questions to encourage diverse responses from which I would then probe on areas of
interest and of relevance to the research aims. Demographic questions were meant to collect
basic information about the respondent, but also note any changes in households and
employment since the landslide. Questions asking if the respondent self-identified with a specific
ethnic group were met with confusion in a 2012 feasibility project in the Alto Beni region of
Bolivia. As a result, the guide was revised to ask about languages spoken as a way to approach
the question of whether the person identified as Aymara, Quechua, or another indigenous group.
A question about household income was dropped after a casual conversation with displaced
camp members revealed that they enjoyed giving social workers and sociologists inaccurate
information about their income as a joke. Finally, questions about the barrio in which they lived,
when they arrived there and where they lived before were meant to provide insight into whether
settlement in the slopes was a recent phenomenon or generational inheritance and whether
residents were primarily people of La Paz or migrants from other parts of Bolivia.
The section on Slope Settlement sought to provide more detailed information on what
brings people to live in the urban slopes of La Paz. Also, it meant to understand daily life in the
neighborhoods and details about the infrastructure in the area. The Disaster section asked about
experiences on the day of the disaster, the extent of loss, ideas about what caused the landslide,
and how life has changed since. The Health section focuses on self-reported health issues and
whether they believe their health has changed since before the landslide, and included more
concrete questions about whether a person or their family has been sick in the past month and
where residents sought health care before and after the landslide. Finally, it also asked
respondents to list four health issues that are on their mind or that are currently worrying them
and their family. The Post-Disaster/Recovery portion of the interview was meant to explore the
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experiences of people in the displacement camps, any options available to them, and the state of
life now that people are moving forward. The question also documented the lives of those that
have resettled damaged slope neighborhoods.
The interview guide was translated from English to Spanish by a native Spanish speaker.
Recognizing that there can be variations in word usage and meaning across different Spanishspeaking regions, the interview guides and informed consents were sent to a colleague in La Paz
to ensure that word usage, grammar, and tone were consistent with the Spanish common to
residents of La Paz, Bolivia.
Fifteen of the twenty-two semi-structured interviews were audio recorded. Of the seven
that were not, four were due to respondent preferences and three were due to weather conditions.
The noise of rain or hail hitting the aluminum roofs of the camp shelters made recordings
unintelligible. After a first attempt at recording in such conditions, it was decided that interviews
conducted during hail or heavy rains would not be recorded due to the lack of sound quality and
to conserve battery and memory space on the audio recorder.
Unstructured Interviews
Unstructured interviews were conducted on occasions when a participant felt
uncomfortable with being audio-recorded and having their experiences noted in a formal way.
The notepad with a printed interview guide and audio-recorder could potentially be interpreted as
too formal or “institutional” and was a source of apprehension for some residents. In these cases,
unstructured interviews were more appropriate and practical. During unstructured interviews in
Callapa and in the displacement camps it was made clear that when we sat to talk it would be as
an interview and that what was being said could be used as data. The informed consent was
administered verbally, as it was with the semi-structured interviews. The interview was much
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more relaxed, while still addressing the major themes of the research. Field notes indicate that
there were 15 unstructured interviews.
Informal Interviews
Informal interviews occurred as the opportunity presented itself. These often took place
in public areas such as community asambleas, improvised markets and stores in the camps, and
at demonstrations. A street vendor that sold hot lunches in Callapa’s plaza was a focal point for
many residents passing by. Sitting on the improvised benches, eating lunch or enjoying a drink
as local residents came, ate, and left allowed an opportunity to speak with and become familiar to
a large group of Callapeños. While there was no structure to the questions and they were not
meant to address any specific research aim or theme, these informal interviews helped to identify
or clarify community dynamics, relevant issues, customs, news, expectations, and grievances. In
addition to providing much needed information to navigate both the physical and social aspects
of the mountain slope areas, informal interviews afforded an opportunity to build and nurture
rapport with community members.
Data Analysis
The semi-structured interviews were analyzed in two ways. Descriptive characteristics
were categorized and entered into an Excel spreadsheet where basic descriptive information
could be drawn from the interview guides and graphed where appropriate. These included
information on age, employment, neighborhood residency, homeownership, time living in the
area, previous residency, and health concerns. While the sample size is relatively small, these
characteristics still provide some insight into the lives of the respondents.
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Second, answers to the open-ended questions regarding life before the landslide, the day
of the event, post-disaster issues and health were compiled. This compilation began in the field
and led to an iterative process, in which questions were refined for clarification and
unanticipated issues incorporated in the interview. The audio file of each interview was reviewed
for further details that may not have been noted in the interview guide during the interview. Field
notes documenting personal observations, detailed descriptions of events and places, and the
results of unstructured and informal interviews were also compiled, entered into a word
processing document, and analyzed for notable points and themes. These were then crossreferenced with audio recordings to identify supporting or contradictory statements and
perceptions. Data that supported or corroborated experiences of others were noted.
Contradictory statements were reviewed for researcher comprehension and incorporated into
future conversations and interviewing for clarification. In cases were contradictions were not due
to researcher error, but due to different recollections, perceptions or positions of the respondents,
the contradiction was noted as data in and of itself.
Data was largely self-reported with accounts being based on respondents’ own
recollections and lived experiences. While this kind of data is subject to recollection bias, key
elements of responses such as community power dynamics, disaster timelines, application of
post-disaster benefits, and internal disputes were checked for internal validity by comparing
them to ethnographic observations, accounts of others and municipal data if available.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of participant observation, semi-structured interviews,
and interactions with residents of affected areas. It also includes the results of interviews and
experiences with municipal workers of the Unidad de Brazos Social (UBS) and the Direccion
Especial de Gestion Integral de Riesgos (DEGIR) in managing the resettlement and relocating
process as camps begin the process of closure. The terms “resettlement” and “relocation” are
sometimes used interchangeably or together as “resettlement/relocation,” signifying an umbrella
post-disaster housing solution. For the purposes of clarity, I refer to “relocation” here as the
government-assisted movement of displaced persons into a new area, presumably for permanent
settlement. I refer to “resettlement” as the return of former residents to damaged properties in an
attempt to reestablish permanent habitation.
In an effort to best describe the events in the landslide-affected areas, this chapter is
divided into two sections. The first section addresses the first research aim of contextualizing
slope settlement and re-settlement. It describes the demographic, historic, and geographic
dimensions of the slopes as reconstructed from residents’ recollections, municipal statements,
and observations of surrounding neighborhoods. It discusses some of the factors influencing
slope settlement and post-disaster resettlement of the affected slopes. The first section also
describes the state of displaced populations in June 2013 at the beginning of the research period.
Using the context provided in the first section as a springboard, the second section
addresses the second research aim of understanding health needs of slope and camp residents. It
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does this presenting self-reported health information and experiences. It also presents a series of
escalating events that led to an institutional eviction of residents from one camp and a violent
expulsion of residents from another. The intra-barrio, inter-barrio, and barrio-external actor
interactions all speak to the social context in which this disaster occurred. As will be seen below,
these events also had significant implications for long-term community recovery and community
health. While certain health issues were reported during semi-structured interviews, health risks
were changing throughout the field work as camp closures loomed and infrastructures were
increasingly strained. Special attention is paid to the health risks that developed as a consequence
of the closure of the Callapa displacement camp.
Upper Slope/Lower Slope Distinction
I have chosen to make a distinction between the upper and lower slope areas as they have
different demographic profiles, different disaster experiences, and face different post-disaster
obstacles. The upper slopes consisted of several densely populated neighborhoods, while the
lower slopes are almost entirely part of the Callapa neighborhood. Approximately three-quarters
of Callapa was buried or wiped away by the landslide. This portion is currently bare of any
structures or vegetation. The surviving portion of Callapa, while suffering severe foundation and
structural damage, still maintains some standing buildings that have been re-occupied by their
owners. Reconstruction in these areas is ongoing. As a result, while parts of Callapa are still
visible as an urban area, a majority has completely disappeared and is awaiting reconstruction. In
this text, I will refer to the surviving section of Callapa as “urban Callapa” and will specifically
note when referring to portions of Callapa that are currently bare and undeveloped.
A camp was created to shelter Callapeños displaced by the landslide. It is located on a
soccer field outside of urban Callapa. As the largest of the six municipal displacement camps, it
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is known locally as el albergue (the shelter). To avoid confusion with both urban and
undeveloped portions of Callapa and to distinguish it as its own unique site, this camp will be
referred to as the Callapa Camp. Other camps will also be referred to specifically by their name,
such as “the Zenobio Lopez I Camp” or “the Escobar Uria Camp”. Some camps are named after
their host community (Flor de Irpavi Camp, Villa Salome Camp, Callapa Camp). In cases where
both camps and their host communities are discussed, the host neighborhood will be referred to
by name with Barrio added for clarification (Barrio Villa Salome).
Upper Slopes
While the interview sample was too small for a comprehensive survey of the local
population, interviews with slope residents and with city officials provided a working knowledge
of the settlement patterns associated with the affected slopes. Upper slope neighborhoods where
the initial breakage began (Kupini II, Valle de las Flores, Prolongacion) consisted of single
family, multi-storied brick homes. The buildings reportedly had basic plumbing for potable water
supplied by the Pampahasi Water Treatment Plant and sewer services. Residents of the disaster
area note that the upper slopes were no different from the neighborhoods that still exist today
adjacent to the affected area. The buildings in the surrounding neighborhoods are made of
relatively fresh, red bricks characteristic of recent construction in La Paz. Some homes remain in
a perpetual state of construction with exposed rebar and unfinished second or third stories. Many
businesses operate out of the first floor of homes, while back rooms and second floors are living
spaces. Residents consisted of a combination of homeowners and renters in single-family brick
homes. Makeshift homes made of aluminum siding, wooden planks, or adobe stood on the
periphery of brick homes near steep drops or cliffs. These homes were less common than the
more established single-family brick homes but the improvised nature of the housing on visibly
32

dangerous property suggested that the land on precipices were generally left unoccupied but then
inhabited by families with less resources for more adequate housing.
While it is often stated that homes in the upper slope neighborhoods had in-home water
connections, the legality of the connections remains in question. Sigfrido, a Risk Management
Supervisor with the Special Directorate of Integrated Risk Management (DEGIR) assigned to the
megadeslizamiento, often travels between camps on the Pampahasi-Callapa slope and urban
Callapa. “See those?” he said pointing to various sized PVC pipes sticking out of the muddy,
mountain slope next to the unpaved road. We were riding in a heavy-duty dump truck from the
Villa Salome camp into urban Callapa. The Villa Salome camp was significantly higher (12,622
feet above sea level) than Callapa (11, 586 feet above sea level) meaning that we would be
descending into Callapa and passing many of the slope neighborhoods surrounding the landslide
area.
The PVC pipes were coupled with others, sharply changing direction multiple times
before leading back into the mountain side. Sigfrido continued, “Those are all illegal. They tap
into existing water lines. Instead of running the paperwork to get water connections they just do
it themselves”. “Why would they not go through the process of running the paperwork?” I asked.
“It has to do with property. Some land transactions are not recorded on paper. There’s no proof
you own the land. Or they just claim the land as theirs without any papers. People sometimes do
that. Just find an empty space and claim it”. Sigfrido’s comments speak to the unregulated nature
of some slope construction and the way otherwise unused property on slopes can be “claimed”.
Just as the homes in the upper slopes had water connections, reports from residents and
risk management experts of La Paz claimed that homes also had sewer connections. The term
alcantarillado is often used to describe the form of waste disposal in the upper slopes before the
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landslide and refers to a piped sewer system. Whether these connections were legal or
unregulated is unclear. Residents of the slopes maintained that the house came with it and that
they appeared to be legitimate connections. A septic tank is a contained vessel for waste that is
not connected to a main sewer system and in the upper slopes was understood as a tanque. The
term septico (septic) however, while suggesting a septic tank system of waste disposal, was
actually used with or interchangeably with pozos, a pit latrine dug directly into the slope with no
containment vessel. Along with actual toilet-sewer systems of waste disposal, these pit latrines
featured prominently in interviews as part of the waste disposal method in the upper slopes.
Settlement in the upper slopes is fairly recent with anecdotal estimates ranging between
twenty-five and thirty years ago. “When I arrived here and built my home, all that [waving
towards slope] was empty. You should have seen it. That’s why I liked it here”, said one resident
of the lower slopes about the looming ridge. With agricultural or cattle-based livelihoods, older
settlers of Callapa often remarked of the recent settlement of the slopes “up there” as an
encroachment and inspired nostalgic recollections of when they first arrived or when they were
children.
Lower Slopes
The lower slopes refer to an area roughly 2.5km2 where the steep, almost vertical drop
from the upper slopes begins to level out into a gradual incline before dropping again towards
southern La Paz. This area is almost exclusively part of the Callapa barrio, except for higher
areas that were once the Santa Rosa de Callapa neighborhood. The relatively level grade of the
lower slopes and ridges that protect it from colder winds allows for small-scale agriculture and
pastoralism with a focus on raising cows, pigs, and chickens. Many of the older residents of

34

Callapa are Aymara-speaking landowners that began settling the lower slopes approximately
fifty years ago and passed down property to family.
Since the initial establishment of Callapa, properties have been divided and sold as lots.
Beginning in the early 2000’s middle and high SES professionals of La Paz started building
personal and vacation homes and commuting into downtown. Vacation homes with personal
soccer fields, basketball courts, and saunas went unoccupied parts of the year, while other lots
that were purchased for future development were left untouched by their owners who currently
have homes elsewhere in La Paz. As of August 2013, large vacation homes remained heavily
damaged and abandoned, with local leaders speculating that owners have moved on to avoid any
losses associated with repair, demolition, and debris clean-up. One conspicuously large yellow
home was abandoned by its owner who decided to move to Spain shortly after the landslide.
In addition to the more extravagant homes, lots were sold to middle-class families that
sought out Callapa for the low cost of property, its weather, relative peacefulness from the bustle
of La Paz, and easy commute to downtown. These middle-class professionals consist of doctors,
teachers, architects, and engineers that sold other homes or stopped renting to invest time and
resources into building a home in Callapa. While residents of a higher SES had the ability to
leave damaged homes unattended, many middle-class families had no other option but to stand
with their investment in Callapa. Julio, a 54 year old doctor, was one of those relegated to
staying. When I met him, he had dozens of adobe bricks drying in front of his home, as noted in
photo 3 on page 36. Julio explained that “adobe is natural and much less expensive than brick.
We can’t afford to rebuild with brick, so I’m using this. Some of the others have caught on”.
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Photo 3 Reconstruction using adobe. Callapa.

Indeed, the cost of reconstruction was deemed prohibitive. Sergio, a resident in the Flor
de Irpavi camp, remarked that “the cost to rebuild is too much. I can’t afford wood. I can’t afford
brick. I can’t afford dirt to make the bricks. Nobody is helping us rebuild and I think we have
been forgotten”. Residents of Callapa with standing homes would sometimes attempt to simply
patch cracks and shore up damaged walls. Perhaps the most common scene of both personal and
financial reinvestment in Callapa was the erections of walls. While not everyone was able to
rebuild or repair homes, a temporary solution was to build walls around perceived property lines
to avoid encroachment by other neighbors and to lay visual claim to their properties until
rebuilding could happen. While reconstruction efforts were visible scenes of personal and
financial reinvestment, the presence of displaced residents close to the damaged areas
represented another form of investment. Some residents waited in displacement camps
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administered by the municipal government or rented a home in nearby neighborhoods in the
upper slopes. Olga, 64, lived with her daughter and son-in-law during the week but lived in the
displacement camp on weekends to be near her property in Callapa to be sure nobody was
building on it. Other residents offered the same explanation. Beto, 37, stated “I was in El Alto for
a month, but I came back to keep an eye on my lot. They can just appropriate it here. People here
are horrible” While living in the camp was not an ideal situation, it afforded residents an
opportunity to stay close to their properties and be vigilant of interlopers attempting to stake
claim to their land.
Disaster
“There was a festival up there [Kupini II] the weekend before the top started to fall,”
began Yolanda as we sat in a downtown La Paz food court. Yolanda began a story that would be
repeated to me several times, always with slightly different details. “There was a little cholita1
that nobody recognized at the festival. She had a disfigured face and unbraided hair. At the end
of the night people started to go back to their homes. The cholita wasn’t from around here, so she
went door-to-door asking for a place to stay”. Yolanda stopped to glance at her friend Beatriz
and both begun to laugh during the story. Beatriz had a degree in environmental engineering
while Yolanda had a degree in education and was an adjunct professor at a nearby university.
Both appeared amused by the story. Yolanda continued. “That’s usually not a problem out in the
rural areas, out in the campo. People will let you stay the night. But here in the city we’re much
meaner”. Given Beatriz’s laughter and the glances she was getting from Yolanda, it was initially
unclear how serious the cholita narrative was taken.

1

Cholita: Primarily Aymara or Quechua women characterized by puffed, layered skirts, high bowler hats and hair
arranged in two long braids.
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Unlike Yolanda’s telling, Josephina told of the cholita in a hushed voice surrounded by
her children in her camp shelter. Josephina shared a shelter in the Callapa displacement camp
with her three daughters and until recently with a family of four. Her entire home had been swept
away by a massive churning of land and she was unsure how her family would rebuild or when.
Her version was told with fewer smiles.
Nobody would let her stay the night. They made fun of her because her hair was loose
and wild. Cholitas usually have their hair braided. She had a disfigured face. So she went
door to door and everyone slammed the door on her face because she was ugly and scary.
Finally, after one house was especially mean to her and cursed at her the cholita became
angry. She said ‘That’s it! Tomorrow, none of this [the neighborhood] will be here’. Then
she turned into a snake and disappeared into the ground. The next day the first cracks
appeared in the ground. Within a week the whole side of the mountain fell. If you notice,
the area that fell left a line [in the ridge] that looks like a snake
The cholita story gained so much credence that, according to Yolanda, a “committee was
formed to find her”. In an official report prepared by the municipal government of La Paz, the
cholita story was included in a chapter dedicated to social aspects of the landslide (Municipal
Government of La Paz 2011). The cholita explanation, that the landslide was punishment
inflicted by an offended paranormal entity, is popular among residents of Callapa and in the
displacement camps. Even when acknowledging more established explanations (i.e. unregulated
construction, underground water), it was usually followed by a hushed “there was also this
cholita…” The cholita narrative is one of several explanations for the landslide, but unique in
that it applies an external locus of responsibility for the landslide, while applying moral
undertones to the destruction of the slopes. That the slopes fell as a result of a curse, to the
exclusion of other explanations, undermines structural, geologic, hydrologic and social
characteristics of risk in the affected zones.
Some media outlets attributed the landslide to unusually heavy rains in the week prior to
the initial breakage. Other outlets added that the rain in combination with unregulated
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construction and overdevelopment led to the landslide. It has been speculated by some residents
and municipal staff that the Pampahasi Water Treatment Plant on the other side of the ridge on
the same slope had been leaking water into the soil for years. Environmental engineers,
geographers, and risk management professionals point to the excess of underground rivers in La
Paz and aquifers in the Callapa area. Sigfrido, of the municipal risk management team, pointed to
the multitude of eucalyptus trees in Callapa. “Eucalyptus is thirsty. It requires a lot of water.
Fifty liters a day. That how you know there’s a lot of water under here”. This was confirmed
when a woman came out of her home to ask for advice. A capped tube approximately 2 inches in
diameter and noted in photo 4 on page 40, stuck out from the arid ground in her front yard. She
uncapped it to reveal water approximately six feet below the surface. “What can I do to get water
from here?” she asked. Sigfrido dropped pebbles down the tube to listen for depth while replying
“Well, it’s just a simple pump”, probably wouldn’t cost too much”. There was a pause before the
municipal team considered the implications. They talked amongst themselves about the dangers
of drawing water from underground voids and the possibility of further instability or sinkholes.
“But you shouldn’t. It’s just going to cause more problems”, they finally told the woman. “This
is why the landslide happened”, Sigfrido finally said. “All this underground water”.
Much of the hydrological and geological concerns appear to benefit from hindsight.
Before the landslide, properties along the slope and down in the rolling incline of Callapa were
considered stable. “It’s the city’s fault. They sent their engineers in and confirmed that the land
was stable. They did studies! We were never warned about this,” said a resident of the higher
part of Callapa. One resident of Villa de las Flores in the upper slopes remembers assessing the
safety of a house he wanted to purchase. “I brought in engineers and topographers and they all
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said it was fine. There was a lot of rock and they say that when there’s a lot of rock the ground is
stable. They said, ‘Just go ahead and buy it. It’s good’”.

Photo 4 Municipal officials inspecting homemade tap to underground water

Despite municipal and private contractor assurances, the first cracks began to appear on
the terrain of the upper slopes. A resident that was assured of the stability of the neighborhood
assumed that the cracks were the result of nearby construction. On Saturday, February 26, 2011
at 7am, approximately 2 hectares of land fell from the upper slopes putting strain on the slopes
immediately below it and damming a nearby river that would soon begin to overwhelm its banks.
Over the course of the day, the weight of the landmass began to slowly press down on other
areas of the slopes and gradually push on homes and roads. By midday, some parts of the upper
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slopes had fallen, but many residents were still unconcerned. The movement was slow and times
appeared contained. However, as more land began to move, more pressure was exerted on slopes
below it creating a push that increased in speed and power throughout the day. A family in a
displacement camp remembered that day.

We went to eat dinner with her [wife’s] family. They live down in Achumani, so we left
in the afternoon. People were saying that the land was sliding but we didn’t notice any
difference and we didn’t think it was going to come our way. By the time we get back, it
must have been eight or nine [o’clock], and the road was gone. The entire street, the
entire block where our house was had disappeared. We never even had a chance to grab
our clothes, our papers, the kids’ things. We only had what we were wearing.

The statement highlights a theme that was common among slope residents that day.
While some parts were falling, many did not think that it would affect them or their home as the
landslide was slow-moving and appeared to start and stop. However as residents went through
their day working, visiting family, or running errands, the push continued. Residents returning to
the upper slopes Saturday night would have seen a road abruptly end over the side of a precipice.
A resident of the Valle de las Flores neighborhood recalled leaving in the afternoon to have
dinner at his mother in law’s home. “When we came back, the whole street our house was on
was gone. Our house and everything was gone” [Male, 24].
Upper Slopes, Complete Loss and the Question of Relocation
“We were at my mother-in-law’s house all day and stayed for dinner. When we came back, the
whole street our house was on was gone. Our house and everything was gone”.
For inhabitants of the upper slopes, the devastation was total. In addition to the loss of
homes and personal belongings, livelihoods were compromised when taxis, minibuses, and
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work-related tools were also lost. The land itself, having fallen, no longer existed and made any
kind of return impossible. Residents of the neighborhoods of Kupini II, Santa Rosa de Callapa,
Villa de las Flores and Prolongacion had the option of moving into the Villa Salome, Escobar
Uria, and Zenobio Lopez (I and II) displacement camps located across the eastern slopes of the
city. The camps were administered by a government official in the GAMLP’s Social Welfare
Unit (Unidad de Brazos Social or UBS). Officials were tasked with maintaining order in the
camps and being the municipal government’s point of contact for camp residents and host
community leaders. Each of the six camps had its own GAMLP camp administrator and each had
a particular management style. By consensus among the other camp administrators and within
the office of the UBS, Ramon was highly regarded as the most effective camp administrator.
Ramon is tall man in his mid-40s. He has a commanding voice honed in Bolivia’s infantry and a
penetrating, direct stare. Ramon punctuated his sentences with an open palm and a chopping
motion. He likes to point that he is from el oriente, the Eastern Bolivian lowlands where people
have a reputation for being boisterous, open and conversational. Ramon likes to contrast his
personality with that of the people of La Paz. “They’re more reserved and polite here in La Paz.
Not at all like us over in el oriente”.
“We have a model camp here,” explained Ramon regarding the Villa Salome camp. He
was walking down row after row of prefabricated wood and aluminum shelters. “You have to get
the people invested. You have to make them responsible for the camp. I always have them do
tasks like clean the sidewalk, pick up trash, or clean the bathrooms”. Ramon had a tendency of
walking down the rows of houses with purpose, giving residents orders and knocking with
authority on easily-rattled particle wood doors.
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Access to the camps depended on the relationship one had with the municipal
government’s division in charge of the camps, the Unidad de Brazos Social (UBS). UBS
managed the logistics of the camp, facilitated the transition into and out from the camps, and
were the residents’ first point of contact with city officials. Camp administrators kept careful
track of outsiders coming to associate with camp residents. Ramon explained:

Early on, we let anybody in. If you wanted to bring clothes, food, you could bring it here
and we would distribute it. But then we started getting people who would come and say,
‘We want to show them a movie’ and we would think ‘Sure, okay’. And they would
come, put on a movie only for us to see that they’re showing them Twister [a movie about
a natural disaster including damages to homes and loss of life].

Ramon described another incident involving a church group that came to speak with the camp
residents.

They said, ‘We just want to talk about the Lord and the Bible,’ then we hear a lot of
shouting and people are upset. Those church people are over there screaming at them!
Screaming ‘this disgrace happened to you because you wronged God!’, ‘This is your fault
for being sinful!’ We had to kick them out!

Since then, UBS has monitored outsiders’ intentions in the camps. Maintaining access to
the camps meant maintaining cordial ties with the UBS and with camp administrators. As a
result, the first few times in the Villa Salome camp, Ramon made a point of personally escorting
me through.
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Benefits and Rifts in the Upper Slopes
At the time of the disaster, Bolivian President Evo Morales expressed his commitment to
helping all those affected by providing newly constructed apartments in El Alto. On February 28
2013, President Evo Morales delivered 160 apartments in the major city of El Alto to families
affected by the landslide (Agencia Boliviana de Informacion 2013; Villa 2013). Another 64
apartments in El Alto were due to be completed and available by April 2013. The construction of
the apartments meant to accommodate families displaced by the landslide cost approximately
four million U.S. dollars. Specifically, the apartments were meant to house residents of the now
non-existent Santa Rosa de Callapa, Kupini II, Pampahasi Central Bajo, Valle de las Flores, San
Juan, Prolongacion, and Kupini II neighborhoods. The apartments in El Alto had potable water,
indoor plumbing, electricity, and gas connections. President Morales described this act as an
“obligation to help those that are most in need, those that do not have an opportunity to solve
their own problems” (Agencia Boliviana de Informacion 2013).
The planned relocation became a point of contention as residents expressed their
disinterest in moving. Camp residents were concerned with the increase of over a thousand feet
in altitude, exposure to the cold winds of the altiplano, the crime in the densely populated city,
and the timing that would move children in the middle of a school semester. The location was
also problematic. El Alto sits on the Andean highlands overlooking the steep valley where La
Paz is located. La Paz’s urban sprawl blends into El Alto’s almost seamlessly, but is marked by
the ridge that separates the undulating geography of La Paz with the expansive flat sprawl of El
Alto. The ridge, known as Ceja de El Alto, is a busy transportation hub and the gateway between
both metropolises. While the cities are relatively close, the apartments are located on the far side
of El Alto and approximately 45 minutes from the Ceja. This meant that relocated residents that
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needed to work, study, or otherwise be in La Paz had to contend with congested and slow
movement through El Alto to merely arrive at the ridge that descends into La Paz. From there,
one would have to transfer onto another bus, colectivo, or other mode of transportation for the
descent into La Paz. Depending on where one wanted to go in La Paz and the time of day, the
trip could last between 1.5 to 3 hours one-way. The commute was starkly different from the 1530 minutes it would take to travel from the Pampahasi slopes into downtown or the popular Zona
Sur of La Paz.
Up until July 2013, the municipal government (GAMLP) established soft closure
timelines that were rescheduled as budgets or progress allowed. Within camps, murmurs could
still be heard of dissatisfaction with the move to El Alto. This changed in late July 2013, during
the course of my fieldwork there, when the GAMLP established a fixed closure date for the
camps. An eviction timeline was set and set and the final inhabitants of the camp had until
August 15 to find other accommodations. The reality of the camp closure heightened the
importance of relocation benefits to El Alto and despite many of the initial objections, made the
move to El Alto more palatable. One resident in June remarked, “I’ve lived here all my life.
Before Valle de las Flores, I lived in Pampahasai [other side of the slope]. This is what I know
and this is where my family is”. By late July, the same resident, along with many others, shared
the sentiment embodied in the phrase “No hay de otra” or “There’s no choice” but to accept
subsidized housing in El Alto. Residents that initially resisted the move now mentioned that they
were waiting to be relocated or had been placed on a waiting list for relocation benefits.
The increasing importance on relocation accentuated the divisions in the camp, most
notably based on access to benefits couched in the language of entitlement and “deservedness”.
The most notable of these distinctions was made between homeowners (propietarios) and renters
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(inquilinos). The distinction was often articulated by residents along the logic that renters did not
lose their homes or their land. It was the landlords that suffered significant losses and as a result,
inquilinos should not be receiving aid. The sentiment was shared by the GAMLP. While initial
statements had promised a final housing solution for all residents, in the course of implementing
relocation plans, criteria were established that narrowed the amount of people that could qualify
for benefits. Homeownership was an important determinant of whether one could receive
benefits, and continued to be a deciding factor at every iteration of relocation plans. Renters were
effectively excluded from benefits.
In La Paz, the word inquilino (renter) was often used pejoratively. It implied instability or
an inability to live up to the responsibilities that heads of household should maintain for their
families. Opinions casually heard of inquilinos usually characterized them as dubious,
untrustworthy due to their lack of permanent ties to the community and opportunistic. This antirenter sentiment contributed to the friction within the camps between propietarios and
inquilinos. The friction was heightened as it appeared to be codified in municipal policy that
denied renters’ access to long-term recovery benefits at the same time that it did not
acknowledge the losses shouldered by renters. Propietarios would sometimes remark that
inquilinos were unfairly benefiting from humanitarian aid and government benefits. One
respondent summed up the popular feeling by saying “They’re trying to get the same things we
get. But we’re not the same. I invested time and money that’s now lost. Them? Why are they
here?” That government policy had increasingly narrowed the circumstances under which people
would qualify for benefits legitimized anti-renter sentiment and created a hierarchy within the
camp that gave propietarios more authority among camp residents.
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Propietarios would sometimes describe inquilinos as lazy and opportunistic. In the same
camps, the inquilinos sometimes described propietarios as uninformed, unsentimental, and
aggressive. Scenes in which propietarios monitored the water usage of inquilinos was common
with some verbally abusing inquilino families and pressuring local administrators to evict them
for taking advantage of aid. A mother of three recalled a propietario watching her draw water: “I
need water for my family too. But she was there saying, ‘You’ve already taken enough. I’m
going to tell Ramon [camp administrator] that you’re taking more than you’re allowed.’”
Another renter described escalated episodes of harassment by propietarios.

They act like they own everything and that we take and take and take. They just
don’t know. They don’t know and I wish there was a way to make them
understand. They monitor how much water we take. One of the women attacked
me. She pulled my hair and slapped me because she said I was taking too much
water and that my kids were out of control. They’re just bad people and they don’t
ever think about us and what we lost. [Female Renter, 24, Villa Salome Camp].

The rift between inquilinos and propietarios was represented spatially in the way the
camps were arranged, particularly in the Villa Salome camp. Out of six rows of homes,
inquilinos were all sheltered together on the same row. The rows of shelters were approximately
7 to 10 feet apart. The inquilino row however only had 3 to 5 feet between inquilino homes and
the row next to it. This inquilino row was located on the edge of the camp that received the
unobstructed, cold altiplano winds. The rest of the camp was protected from the winds by the
slopes behind the camp and the inquilino row that blocked cold winds from below. The shelters,
with unsealed aluminum roofs and cracks in the walls, made exposure to the cold especially
striking for inquilinos. Perhaps due to the configuration of the camps, there was very little
interaction between groups of propietarios and inquilinos. All rows led to a common space
47

where the bathroom and laundry areas were located. There was very little need for one to walk
through another row.
The higher slopes began to fall while many were out for the afternoon and evening.
Natan, 30, remembered, “We were at my mother-in-law’s house all day and stayed for dinner.
When we came back, the whole street our house was on was gone. Our house and everything
was gone”. As the land began to fall and sections were closed off, many residents found
themselves watching from afar as their homes fell away. Parked cabs and minibuses were buried.
Work tools were also lost leaving tradespeople, plumbers, and craftspeople without a way to
make a living. Hector, a father of four explains the difficult situation he faced. “I lost all of my
tools. I’m a handyman. I fix everything. Mostly plumbing. But I lost it all and now I can’t work
and nobody is hiring. I don’t care what, I will dig dirt. I just need to feed my family”. Contrary to
dominant narratives, the livelihoods of inquilinos suffered in the landslide. Magdalena, Hector’s
wife describes the uncertainty of their situation. “[President] Evo said that we were all going to
get homes. Now we don’t know. We have two weeks before they run us out. They must think we
don’t want to leave, but that’s not it. We don’t have anywhere to go”.
While homeowners were allotted apartments in El Alto and slowly began leaving the
camps, renters were left with many questions. The prioritization of resources had excluded them
as “deserving” citizens, while popular characterizations further marginalized their claim to any
benefits. The Villa de las Flores barrio, often described by former residents as a model
neighborhood, a place that won a city-wide competition for best barrio, and where everybody
worked together had been fractured in such a way that no cohesive community junta could be
established. Renters were unable to form any kind of formal appeal or demand for promises that
were made early in the post-disaster process.
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While there was only one reported incident of politically motivated loss of benefits, both
residents and administrators confirmed that it takes place on a regular basis. The mayor of La
Paz, Luis Revilla Herrero, was a co-founder of the Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM) political party
in 1999. There was an initial alliance between MSM and Bolivia’s currently ruling party
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) until a bitter split resulted in animosity between parties. As it
stood in 2013, the municipal government of La Paz was controlled by the MSM party. A few
blocks away at the Presidential Palace, the MAS party through President Evo Morales Ayma
held the national government. In the camps, where benefits were at stake, political affiliations
could put one in or out of favor with key decision-makers. Antonio, a resident of the Villa
Salome camp, supported the MSM party and the administration of the mayor of La Paz when the
camp residents’ representative to the GAMLP was a MAS-ista or supporter of the MAS party.
Antonio explained to me that he had been depurado, or purged. “I was taken off the lists [for
benefits]. They said I didn’t qualify anymore”. In the different accounts of this particular
incident, being taken “off the list” appeared to be remarkably simple.
Antonio, a father of four, bought a house in the upper slopes after renting for many years.
The home was a three-story, blue house with all the basic services. He had been granted a loan
by one of the large banks in Bolivia. “I had engineers come in and look at it. They said it was
fine. So I bought it”. Antonio’s home was one of the first to begin falling. It was a slow fall that
started as cracks appeared in his wall and slowly earth began to fall from under his house.
Antonio was able to move some of his most important things out of the house and watched as
half of the structure hung over the precipice before breaking and falling. Home loans for houses
that were destroyed in the landslide were not forgiven, leaving Antonio and many other
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homeowners in debt. He was counting on relocation benefits to alleviate some of the pressures he
and his family faced in trying to move forward.
“It happens. You have bad people. Selfish people sometimes who can’t see past their own
interests”, said Ramon of the politically motivated loss of benefits. Antonio’s story was common
knowledge and widely regarded as unfair but ultimately unresolvable. “It’s because the mayor
and the president don’t like each other. Then you get messes like this,” stated one municipal
worker referring to the opposing political parties of the sitting mayor and president. The MASsupporting representative that excluded Antonio from receiving benefits eventually left, but
Antonio’s situation remained. Ramon, also a MSM supporter, helped Antonio when possible but
in June and July was pessimistic about the outlook of improving Antonio’s circumstances. By
August, things had changed. Ramon was able to appeal Antonio’s case to the vice-mayor of the
municipal zone. For once, both seemed optimistic about the outcome. While this one case saw
some progress, the final housing solution for many inquilinos, and a few propietarios in the Villa
Salome camp remained unresolved as the deadline for closure, August 14, approached.
Host Community Pressures
Displacement camps began to feel pressure from host communities regarding eviction
timelines. All the camps, with the exception of the Flor de Irpavi camp were located on
community soccer fields. The Flor de Irpavi camp was located on land that was being eased from
a local property owner. At the municipal level, administrators acknowledged that there was
growing frustration with the presence of the camps by host communities. During one meeting
between community leaders in Villa Salome and Ramon the Villa Salome Camp administrator,
Pablo, the president of the local junta expressed his concern. “You all said you would be gone by
now. We need to know when”. Ramon’s usual commanding demeanor was scaled back
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significantly during this meeting with the local junta members. “I assure you that we are going to
be done. We have moved out three already today. You can see that we are 40% out”. Ramon’s
tone was conciliatory, as he continued to be peppered with questions. “How long?”, “When?”,
“How many?” Pablo challenged Ramon’s responses. “You said that before”, “That’s too slow”,
“That’s not a solid date”. Ramon was almost apologetic. Notably, at no point was municipal
authority ever used as leverage over the requests of the local community junta.
“It’s time they left”, Pablo said agitated. As the president of the Villa Salome community
junta, Pablo routinely met with camp administrators to discuss camp closures. “They come here
and they have stayed because the municipal government gives them everything. Why would
anybody leave?” Pablo points to the camp. “That’s our soccer field. They’ve had it for two years
and it’s time we get it back”. The residents of Villa Salome had plans for the soccer field. Local
children had to commute an hour away to school. The junta was gathering money and organizing
fundraisers to build a school on the community soccer field. The sooner the displacement camp
closed, the sooner the local community of Villa Salome could build a school to cut the commute
time for children in the neighborhood. Pablo also pointed to the social problems with the camp.
“They fight here at night. They drink and then cause problems. But the UBS people are never
here to see that. They don’t see the drunks going through our neighborhood or the damage they
do”. Pablo also stated that the GAMLP never was clear with the community about the length of
time that the camps would be present. “They never talked to us about it, but how do we say no?
You want to help your fellow man because we are all human, but there are limits. They should
have talked to us”.
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Lower Slopes, Rethinking Callapa and Questions of Resettlement
For inhabitants of the lower slopes, mainly Callapa, the loss was devastating but not total.
Instead of the separation and the falling of land experienced by the upper slopes, Callapa
experienced massive underground movement that opened up crevasses and moved landmarks in
different directions and distances. The central plaza of Callapa shifted by 20 meters, while other
buildings moved as much as 120 meters. In addition, the falling landmasses created a churning
swell of land that buried some parts of Callapa. Despite all this, return to one’s land was
hypothetically possible.
The GAMLP through the municipal Risk and Emergency Management Division
(DEGIR) and the municipal Division of Social Welfare (UBS) established a resettlement
timeline based on the geological stability of private property. In 2011, two of the seven sectors of
Callapa were approved for resettlement. The other five sectors of Callapa were deemed unstable.
In the meantime, residents who were not allowed to return to their land were housed in two
nearby displacement camps; the Callapa megacampamento located on Callapa’s former soccer
field and the smaller Flor de Irpavi camp located on rented property in a nearby neighborhood.
The camps, as noted in photos 5 and 6 on page 53, had potable water for personal
consumption, general purpose water for laundry and hygiene, electrical power and septic tanks
under aluminum public restrooms. Despite access to basic services, the close proximity of other
inhabitants and the lack of privacy along with all its accompanying tensions and conflicts made
life in the camps particularly unbearable for residents. The conditions in the camp were markedly
different from those that decided to resettle their homes and lands in damaged, but stable,
portions of Callapa.
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Photo 5 Row of shelters in Callapa Camp

Photo 6 Callapa Camp bathroom and laundry facilities
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From February 2011 to May 2013, residential Callapa had no electrical power. Potable
water was accessed through 11 public spigots, noted in photo 7 on page 54. These were locked to
prevent inappropriate use and were only accessed during designated times, leading to long lines
and long wait times to fill containers. Residents also accessed water from small springs that
while widely regarded as not clean, were often the only available option. A nearby river was also
used for disposing of human waste. Despite the lack of basic services, there was a pride
expressed in being able to return to owned lands and homes to slowly rebuild.

Photo 7 Locked public water spigot. One of eleven in Callapa
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Asambleas
“Como vaya Callapa, va el tubo!”. There was approving applause and some nodding
heads at this community gathering or asamblea. Once every two weeks or as needed, a
community meeting was called to discuss pressing issues. As noted in photo 8 on page 56, the
asamblea was held in the open plaza with community members waiting along the side for their
turn to speak. Residents expressed support by shouting approving or discouraging comments.
Occasionally, a resident would ask permission to speak and state a position.
Veva, a member of the community junta further explained the significance of the “tube”.
“The tubo is a water pipeline that feeds the Zona Sur of La Paz. It runs through Callapa. We have
said that if the government will not help us, we will dynamite it”. The community of Callapa had
threatened to destroy the water supply to the affluent Zona Sur before. Yolanda, a ten-year
resident of Callapa and a professional in downtown La Paz, clarified. “It’s something we say to
get attention. We get the news stations out here, the newspapers. We try to let people know about
our situation”, she paused before saying, “but the comunarios are capable of doing it. And they
still might”.
The comunarios, older-settled, primarily Aymara-speaking land owners, stood together at
the asambleas, sometimes huddled in several groups. Some of the older men wore weathered
slacks, sweater vests and newsboy hats, while younger men wore weathered jeans, pullovers and
straw hats to protect from the sun. The women wore traditionally layered Andean skirts, shawls
and the high bowler hats characteristic of the cholita paceña. As a group, the comunarios
represented the older generation of settlers that arrived in the lower slopes when large areas of
land could be claimed for small-scale agriculture and raising animals as noted in photo 9 on page
57 . Today, comunarios still raise pigs, goats, chickens, and cows on their land.
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Photo 8 Community asamblea in Callapa

They have a reputation for being from “el campo”, a term to describe them as rural but
also as a way of identifying them as rough-mannered people with their own ideas and traditions
regarding feuds, conflict resolution, and justice. When a woman screamed at the asamblea that
comunarios had built a wall on her land claiming the property was theirs and then threatened her
with machetes when she objected, a gentleman turned to me and said, “es que son del campo”
(it’s because they’re from the rural areas).
Upon descending into Callapa from the upper slopes, a straw man could be seen tied to a
power line pole. “It means that it is community justice here” said Sigfrido to me. “The
comunarios here son fregados. They’re old rules”. As older-settled residents with an extra-
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judicial approach to conflicts, comunarios held considerable influence in the lower slopes and in
Callapa.

Photo 9 Comunario home. Lower slopes.

Yolanda was part of a newer settlement wave beginning in the 1990s that included
middle class families and professionals from more central areas of La Paz. As a group, they are
referred to as vecinos and represent a changing Callapa in which professionals bought lots from
comunarios who sold portions of their lands to families as needed. Yolanda’s family, like many
others, came to Callapa for the opportunity to own property and build a home in a relatively
peaceful area. While downtown La Paz was only on the other side of the nearby ridge, the lower
slopes benefitted from less of the traffic congestion and space limitations that one encountered in
older and more central areas of La Paz. An extra benefit was that the ridge protected the lower
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slopes from the biting cold winds of the altiplano that are sometimes funneled into downtown La
Paz. Callapa and the lower slopes were often several degrees warmer than nearby neighborhoods
and had weaker winds. “We lived in an apartment in Miraflores”, she said referring to one of the
older and more congested neighborhoods in La Paz. “But, we wanted a home. We were tired of
renting and living in La Paz is so expensive. Here we can have pets”. Examples of vecinos
homes are noted in photos 10 and 11 on page 59.
Callapa saw the building of seasonal vacation homes complete with saunas, swimming
pools, personal soccer fields and basketball courts. In the wake of the landslide, many of the
wealthier families abandoned these large homes instead of undertaking the process of repair or
demolishment and clean-up. Similarly, some middle-class owners of undeveloped lots chose to
be absent from asambleas. One of these lot-owners, Alberto, 34, felt that events in Callapa did
not affect him because he never built any structures on his property. Alberto noted that he could
not sell the land because the landslide caused property values to plummet, putting sellers at a
loss. His plan was to wait and see if he could sell the property later or perhaps still build on it in
the future. During the rest of the research period, Alberto would jokingly ask me for updates on
the current events in Callapa, since he was not interested in attending the asambleas.
Alberto and others who owned property in Callapa, yet did not maintain a presence in the
community, would see that their ownership status was problematic. As will be discussed below,
shifting property lines made land ownership uncertain. Meanwhile, the struggles that Callapeños
endured made them vocally resentful of “absentee” residents. During asambleas, where votes on
issues of property, planning, and ownership are counted, absentee lot-owners and their interests
are explicitly regarded as insignificant and irrelevant to community decisions.
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Photo 10 Vecino home in reconstruction.

Photo 11 Buried vecino home.

This was based on the idea that “if they [absentee residents] cared at all about their
properties, they would be here”. Property ownership was further complicated by the active
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construction of homes on bare land, with little recognition of prior ownership. There existed the
potential for absentee residents to find a wall and home built on their property, with full support
of the community junta.
At the asambleas, vecinos often stood as individuals, instead of as families like the
comunarios. The individual was usually a representative for the family coming to asambleas to
stay updated with the latest news. They were characterized by designer clothing, accessories, and
a business-casual manner of dressing. While some lived in displacement camps, vecinos often
still stood out through their accent-free Spanish. Comunarios’ dominant language, almost
without exception, was Aymara, leaving them with a distinctive pattern and cadence in their
Spanish. Barring that, people would often state whether they were comunarios or vecinos in
casual conversation and this appeared to be an important identifier. Interestingly, all the
members of the community junta were vecinos, while members of the junta admitted that
comunarios held significant influence and held their own smaller asambleas behind closed
doors.
While Callapa had residents living in camps and on private properties, they were
uniformly vocal about their dissatisfaction with the pace of infrastructure repair. Asambleas were
often a place to vent frustrations and propose courses of actions. At the particular asamblea
described earlier, threatening to dynamite the water line to another portion of the city was
considered an acceptable course of action for leverage. It had worked in the past and the saying,
“Como vaya Callapa, va el tubo” could be heard in the background of other asambleas,
demonstrations, and public gatherings.
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“The Water Situation is Unsustainable”
A reoccurring topic in asambleas from June to August 2013 was water. The eleven public
spigots in urban Callapa were non-operational at times or had low water pressure. The needs of
the community were starting to exceed the supply of water as more people returned to their
homes. One member of the junta remarked, “Someone did the math. For everyone to get water,
all 11 spigots would have to be open 24 hours and every family could only have 12 minutes”.
Families would often gather as many containers as possible, as noted in photo 12 on page 62, and
wait for hours for the spigot to open. The neighborhood was billed on the water as a collective
unit. Payments by each family were made to the community junta who would then pay the
municipal water company, the Empresa Pública Social de Agua y Saneamiento (EPSAS). So
while all families were supposed to pay into the collective water bill, most families were also
experiencing an inadequate supply of potable water for their everyday needs. The gap in
payment and services received created frictions among those that began to resettle Callapa. Since
2011, residents worked to install pipes, clear debris and push the municipal government for more
resources. In 2013, as housing issues began to get resolved and as more sections of Callapa were
approved for resettlement, there was a slow influx of people into an already strained water
infrastructure.
Residents who began returning to Callapa in July 2013 were perceived to have not
contributed to the overall present-state recovery of Callapa. Gladys, a recently-returned mother
of three stated, “They say I have to pay back-payments for all the work they did. They want me
to pay $300 Bolivianos (approximately 45 US dollars) to access the water. They said it’s because
I didn’t do my part”.
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Photo 12 Gathering water at one of Callapa’s public spigots.

Gladys was referring to the efforts by residents of Callapa that included demonstrating at
the municipal water department, public appeals to the mayor, and digging ditches to lay water
pipes when public spigots were finally installed. The community of Callapa was billed as a
whole for the water service. New residents, however, were reportedly being charged an extra fee
to simply access the water, but it was unclear who was charging. Two residents noted that they
were being charged by community members that held keys to the spigots, presumably under
orders from the junta. Members of the junta themselves denied any attempts to apply fees to
newly resettled residents of Callapa. It is possible that the charges were levied by an individual
seeking to take advantage of newly arrived residents. Regardless, a sentiment of resentment was
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observed brewing in narratives of respondents speaking about other factions of the local
population as resources and access to water became scarcer.
As more residents settled into Callapa, the junta had a more formal approach to resolving
the “water situation”. During an asamblea on Sunday June 30th, a summary of past efforts to
rebuild the water infrastructure in Callapa was read by the president of the community junta. The
list of efforts included letters, forms, petitions, and requests that were forwarded to different
levels of the municipal government. After the summary, the president of the junta of Callapa
declared that the water situation was “unsustainable”. “I call on all my neighbors here today, and
tell those that are not here, that tomorrow we will descend on EPSAS at 8am to apply pressure. I
ask that you all be there”.
For five hours residents of Callapa stood in front of the municipal water company,
EPSAS. As noted in photo 13 on page 64, residents gathered around the entrance and blocked the
driveway leading into the building. Residents shouted “We want water! We want sewer! We
want it now dammit!” Fireworks were set off, drawing attention to the crowd of over 100
Callapeños blocking the gates. Eventually, the group began blocking westbound traffic, causing
traffic to detour. The demonstration was successful in forcing a response from a head executive
of EPSAS. Twelve representatives of Callapa were invited into the offices to discuss the details
of returning water infrastructure to the neighborhood. EPSAS agreed to send engineers
immediately to assess the feasibility of installing more water lines. The unsustainable water
situation of Callapa appeared to be moving towards a resolution.
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Photo 13 Demonstration at EPSAS demanding reinstallation of water services in damaged slopes

Land Rights
Land rights were another sources of tension and two situations began to develop. First,
municipal engineers sent after the EPSAS demonstration determined that no more water lines
could be installed in Callapa. The land had shifted in such a way that property lines were
severely affected and personal claims to property were continuously challenged. Inhabitants
would claim property that extended into existing roads, cutting off transportation. Neighbors
argued over property lines that had shifted and were not sure whether to base their property lines
on GPS, landmarks, or in relation to each other. Some residents used this as an opportunity to
increase the size of their land. “Each one of you has hired a different architect and engineer to
survey your land. And because you pay them, they’re going to tell you exactly what you want to
hear. ‘Yes, you have a few extra meters here. Yes, you have an extra few meters there’”, said a
young man at an asamblea. The president of the junta declared also that “bad neighbors want to
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unfortunately take advantage of this situation for their own personal gain”. Due in large part to
the inability to reconcile property issues, the reestablishment of basic sewer services and the
extension of water lines to Callapa was on indefinite hold.
In addition, properties were being reclaimed outside of the infrastructure in urban
Callapa. Illegal homes began to appear higher on the main slopes. The slope areas above Callapa
had been terraced and curved for stability. The terracing and curves allowed for improved load
bearing. Eventually, the main slope was to be a green space and was off-limits for further
resettlement. Still, small shacks could be seen in the terraced slope surrounded by a spraypainted rectangle representing property lines. Further up, each one of the terraces was checkerboarded with spray painted rectangles. Property lines were not restricted by vertical surfaces on
the terrace but instead led into and up terraces suggesting a plan to cut into load-bearing terraces
to make way for personal property and illicit construction.
Meanwhile a second situation was developing. The GAMLP continued undertaking a
measured eviction of the displacement camps. As land was deemed stable, residents slowly
returned to private properties in urban Callapa. Camp shelters that initially belonged to donor
organizations like the Red Cross and TECHO were bought by the GAMLP and signed over to
residents. Municipal teams helped to disassemble shelters and reassemble them on private
property that was inspected for stability. Gradually, the main displacement camp in Callapa was
seeing gaps in the rows of shelters and slightly less people.
Throughout all this, thoughts began to steer towards what would happen after the camp
closed, with special interest being paid to how the soccer field on which the camp was located
would be used. The fate of the soccer field was often discussed at asambleas as a quality of life
issue, highlighting the symbolic importance it held within communities in La Paz. Just as in the
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Villa Salome barrio that hosted the Villa Salome camp, the absence of the soccer field was often
associated with a perceived increase in juvenile delinquency, an increase in vandalism, underage
alcoholism, and a lack of community cohesion from a lack of events, potlucks, and tournaments
that were traditionally held on soccer fields. One resident summed up the popular sentiment of
the soccer field.
You have to understand. It’s everything. It’s where we play. It’s where we hold festivals.
Potlucks. Tournaments. Businesses next to the field will sell soccer shirts and balls and
things like that. So it’s jobs too. Without it, the kids don’t have anything to do. That’s
why you see so much drinking. Fights. We need the field. [Male, 34, Callapa]

The GAMLP took the position that the community of Callapa should work to finalize its
own version of a community plan, including property lines, positions/orientations of roads, and
location of public spaces before any public works could be undertaken. A member of the
municipal staff assigned to Callapa remarked, “I think what happened is that they we spoiled
them. NGO X came in and gave them all these things and now they expect more. We are
attempting to have them, as a community, problematize their own issues and solve their own
problems”.
Sacking of Callapa Camp
On the night of July 17, a group of unidentified persons sacked the megacampamento in
Callapa. The aluminum restrooms were disassembled and stolen, leaving only damaged septic
tanks as noted in photo 14 on page 67. The potable water spigot attached to it was also stolen
along with the large black tanks of water for general use. Outdoor laundry sinks were smashed or
stolen. As a response to what appeared to be looting, the municipal government of La Paz
removed items of value, including the camp’s light fixtures and the children’s playground at the
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center of the camp. The effect was devastating. Unlike persons living in damaged, residential
Callapa, residents of the Callapa megacamp benefitted from regular access to potable water,
power and septic tanks. Now they had access to none of those things and empty spaces, as noted
in photo 15 on page 68, where important services used to be.

Photo 14 Damaged septic tank after bathrooms stolen in Callapa Camp.
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Photo 15 Empty space where bathroom, laundry and playground once sat. After looting.

Rumors circulated about who was responsible for the crisis. Some camp residents openly
and angrily discussed the possibility that the “sacking” was a ploy by the city to rid themselves
of the responsibility of supporting displaced persons. Others openly accused GAMLP
administrators of personally orchestrating the looting and benefitting personally. One crying
unidentified woman at the camp site was heard asking “How could Marcos [Callapa
administrator] do this to us! He has a home! Why does he need to take our laundries [outdoor
sinks]?” This anti-GAMLP sentiment was best illustrated by an incident in which a young
member of the municipal staff arrived at the camp to take photographs of the damage. The young
staffer was attacked and chased from the site. “They attacked me with rocks. They hit me. I got
the hell out of there. They wouldn’t let me take my pictures”. As a result, GAMLP personnel
began moving in pairs or groups. During this time, the lead member of DEGIR in the area
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advised outsiders not to go to the camps. “It’s probably best if you do not go. I wouldn’t. They’re
really upset right now. Really tense. It’s too dangerous right now”.
In addition to placing responsibility for the looting on local authorities, blame also was
placed on the nebulous “bad neighbor”. Mirroring some of the narratives of the Villa Salome
camp, homeowners blamed renters. “Once the camp closes, they [renters] don’t get anything. No
help. No support. We get to go home. They don’t. So when they hear that the camps are going to
close, they take advantage. They get what they can while they can”. Meanwhile, renters blamed
homeowners. “They took what they can to rebuild their own homes. They don’t care about the
rest of us. They just want to take so they can put it in their own homes on their own land”. At the
end of the research period, it was still unclear who was responsible for the looting on July 17.
However, it was hard to ignore the 6-foot high, black plastic water containers that began
appearing around town that were extremely similar to those that were stolen from the camps.
Ultimatum and Evacuation
Shortly after the camp was stripped of its infrastructure, a message was disseminated
from Callapa’s influential comunarios. The camp had until Sunday, four days, to be cleared of all
prefabricated shelters and residents. If not gone, any remaining homes would be burned to the
ground. Comunarios expressed that they were reclaiming the soccer field. This new threat
undermined any measured plan the GAMLP had for resettling residents. The four days from
Thursday to Sunday were characterized by a frantic rush to disassemble and move the camp
shelters to private property regardless of land stability or authorization. Photo 16 on page 71
notes trucks and residents attempting to disassemble and transport shelters. A GAMLP staffer
noticed a shelter being disassembled and loaded into a truck without the required transfer
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documents. “Look they’re taking away the house”, he said to the camp administrator Alejandro.
With a resigned shrug Alejandro replied, “Yeah? So what do you want me to do? Fight them?”
Three cargo trucks were parked near several shelters as families worked to frantically
disassemble homes. Each panel required between four and six able-bodied persons to move and
lift into a truck. Many of the families with healthy men and teenage boys were already gone. The
homes that remained belonged to elderly residents and families with small children. Flor and
Amparo, two long-time residents of Callapa, were overseeing some of the movement. Before the
landslide, Flor ran a store from her home. Now she ran a small store with essential items, such as
toilet paper and canned goods, from her shelter. Flor was a respected member of the community
and well-known. She could often be seen organizing lines for signatures or payments and
facilitating who would speak next at asambleas. Amparo was another long-time resident of
Callapa and as a former member of the community junta was well known. Amparo lived in the
camp to look over her lands while her husband worked in the city. Together with her husband,
Amparo acted as caretaker to her chronically ill younger brother. Flor and Amparo now stood
together in the camp observing the many new empty spots, the dozens of burning or charred piles
of trash, and the disassembly of shelters by their respective families. Given that the homes
technically still belonged to any one of several NGO until proper paperwork was filed through
GAMLP, the disassembly and movement of shelters was still considered theft. This particular
movement was done on the weekend when it was assured that no municipal personnel would be
approaching the camp.
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Photo 16 Disassembly of homes and evacuation on day of deadline. Callapa Camp.

In the mad rush to disassemble homes. Amparo began arguing with a middle-aged
woman moving panels. “No! That’s not for you, you can’t take that home!” The woman
responded with “Why not? It’s mine! I live here!” A small crowd began to gather and shout at
the woman attempting to load part of her shelter into a truck. “It’s not for you! You can’t take
it!” to which she respond, “It’s mine.”
Amparo called the president of the junta, Don Bernardo. As president of the community
junta, don Bernardo ran the weekly asambleas and was the primary contact to resolve
community issues. He was often called to help settle property line disputes, fights and domestic
disputes. During asambleas, his shouts resonated through the small plaza with words like
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desgraciadamente, lamentablemente and hermanos vecinos. Here he patiently explained to the
now crying woman that the shelter she had lived in for over a year did not belong to her because
she was an inquilina—a renter. Since she did not own land, even by the loose standards of the
past few days, she was not allowed to leave with a home. It was given to another family and now
she was out. Amparo, with disgust on her face, said, “Inquilinos. Always trying to scam people,”
before turning back and helping a small family disassemble their home. The rest of the afternoon
and evening was spent disassembling homes and loading them onto dump trucks. The woman
that was stopped from taking her shelter waited until don Bernardo left to bring a large cargo
truck.
That week, camp shelters began to appear on precarious edges where the landslide had
occurred and on property where resettlement was prohibited. Without the resources to enforce
municipal policy, USB and DEGIR team members in Callapa were unable to stop the flow of
people onto unauthorized and unstable land. Where there were once rows of pre-fabricated
plywood and asbestos shelters, there were now empty spaces outlined by concrete sidewalks.
Dozens of charred spots marked where trash was burned, while many dozens of others continued
to smoke.
In attempting to make sense of those days, a rumor began to swirl that the government
was attempting to use the soccer field/displacement camp land for private use. The comunario
ultimatum was a way to reclaim the soccer field for Callapa before the city could “take it”. This
rumor contradicted an exchange I had several days earlier with members of the municipal team
in Callapa. Speaking of the heavily damaged elementary school in Callapa, the team members
lamented the inability to use the soccer field to build a new school. “Unfortunately, people here
think they can do better with soccer than with school. In the end, it’s their soccer field so it’s
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really up to them, but that’s how they think”. While, it is possible that the rumor and the
exchange are unrelated, this is only an illustration of what appears to be a lapse in information as
neither party appeared to know what the other’s perceptions or intentions were. Also, it
illustrates the “hands-off” approach that I often witnessed the GAMLP implement towards
matters in Callapa and which made the rumor seem out of character. By Monday, several homes
remained. There was no burning, but the message had served its purpose. Over the next few
days, remaining homes were moved and a soccer tournament was scheduled on the nonexistent
field for August 17.
Health
Semi-structured interviews contained a segment dedicated to questions about health.
Twenty-two community members were interviewed using the guide and asked questions with
regards to their perceived states of health. Sixty-eight percent of respondents reported that they
were in good health, while 23% reported that they were doing “fine”, or a non-committal but
positive state. 9% of respondents were neutral about their current state of health stating that they
were neither good nor bad, and had ups and downs that evened out. No respondents stated that
they considered their current health to be bad, despite a sentiment that overall health has
worsened since the 2011 landslide. This can be explained in-part by an observed uneasiness in
respondents and in associates in La Paz in disclosing personal ills. When allowed the open ended
option to state how they considered their own health (“Tell me about your current state of
health”), most would choose a positive or non-committal response. The following question
probed slightly deeper by giving three options and asking the respondent to commit to one of
three conditions. (Has your health been better, worse, or the same since the landslide?). The
progression in questioning allowed for 36% of respondents to state that their health worsened
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after the landslide while 64% stated that it remained the same with no respondents saying their
health has become better. The term “health” was left intentionally broad to allow respondents to
take topics of health in directions that were of importance to them. In these cases, when asked to
elaborate, respondents who felt their health had worsened often discussed issues of stress, shame,
and depression associated with displacement and not being able to provide a home for one’s
family. These sentiments were found more often in respondents from the various displacement
camps instead of from respondents living in urban Callapa.
Despite respondents’ focus on emotional and mental health in the wake of the landslide, a
more direct question about whether they had fallen sick in the past month revealed that a
majority (82%) of respondents reported being sick in the past month. Similarly, 82% of
respondents reported that a member of their immediate family had also been sick in the past
month. Symptoms were most often those associated with the common cold, referred to as a
resfriado, or diarrhea attributed by respondents to the cold winds of the Bolivian winter. In most
cases, respondents reported managing illness in their homes with home remedies of teas and
vitamins. Before the landslide, 73% of respondents stated that they would take care of their
illness at home compared to 23% going to a clinic and 5% going to the public hospital 30
minutes away. After the landslide, the numbers shifted slightly as less respondents addressed
illnesses at home and more sought out a clinic (36%).This was attributed to more medical
personnel being near the disaster-affected zones after the landslide. Specifically, Cuban doctors
were stationed on the periphery of the Callapa camp, while the Villa Salome camp had a
municipal clinic outside of its gates.
During this portion of the interviews, the importance of cold winds as impacting illness
became prominent. Descriptions of the weeks after the landslide, where several hundred people
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were housed in tent cities outside the psychiatric hospital across the river from Callapa, included
mentions of several infant deaths due to diarrhea attributed to the cold. Illness in the camps was
sometimes recognized as being due to the unsealed shelters that allowed cold winds into homes.
One inquilino, whose shelter walls faced a steep slope and were exposed to cold winds, blamed
them for his family’s occasional flu-like symptoms of fever, nausea, and body aches.

Post-Threat Callapa
After the forced evacuation of the Callapa Camp, health issues took on another
dimension. Questions of health became more closely associated with health risks brought on by
the unstable circumstances. In Callapa, the water infrastructure that was already deemed
“unsustainable” by the local population was completely overwhelmed as hundreds more needed
potable water. Residents that resettled private properties in urban Callapa had access to locked
spigot water during certain hours, but long lines and unclear availability resulted in some
families using alternate sources of water. One of the main alternate sources of water was a small
spring by Callapa’s main road and noted in photo 17 on page 76. The hole in the rocky ground,
approximately 2 feet in diameter, was a popular place for cows to drink water and for children to
quickly collect bucket-sized amounts. In June 2013, four improvised pig pens were located
within twenty feet and uphill from the water source. By August 2013, as illicit reconstruction
near the spring continued, the four improvised pig pens were demolished in favor of seven
permanent pig shelters. The home along with the pig pens were built uphill and in the immediate
area of the spring (within approximately 20 feet) as noted in photo 18 on page 76.
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Photo 17 Main spring in Callapa. Used for human and livestock water needs.

Photo 18 Illicit construction. Urban Callapa.
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At least one family was using the river noted in photo 19 on page 77 for water. The same
river was confirmed to be used by another family for human waste purposes. In addition,
Callapa’s access to the river was downriver from densely populated remaining communities in
the upper slopes. The contamination of the river was such that cattle would not drink from it due
to the smell. Still, it was common for residents to be seen washing clothes in the river upstream
while families downstream collected water in jugs or buckets.

Photo 19 River bordering Callapa. Used by some as water source and for disposal of human waste.
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Many of the residents that evacuated from the Callapa displacement camp resettled
unauthorized land with no basic services and far from any of the established public spigots such
as the home noted in photo 20 on page 78. While the situation was not ideal, some felt that their
hands had been forced and that there was no other option than to return onto their land. These
families used other small springs, holes in the approximately six inches in diameter, for all their
water needs. During one visit to the spring and noted in photo 21 on page 80, a family was
washing clothes, making pig slop, and drawing water for cooking. The water had a dirty smell
and many remarked that the water had a “salty taste”. One person remarked that he was sure the
water “had bichos [bugs]2” but there was nothing they could do.

Photo 20 Camp shelter moved into upper slopes. Note empty Callapa Camp site lower left.
2

Bichos is often used to refer to insects such as roaches, moths and mosquitos. It is also often used as a reference to
microorganisms in the water that residents find to be the cause of sickness.
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Emerging Health Issues
The forced evacuation of the Callapa camp that spurred the use of the ridge as a place for
fecal waste and the more extensive use of small springs occurred during Bolivia’s winter and La
Paz’s dry season. The fecal matter dried into the dusty ground, but remained exposed and
vulnerable to flow downslope to communities at the first rains. By the time of my departure in
August 2013, the first signs of gastrointestinal distress and heavy diarrhea were beginning to be
seen among families that had limited access to water and sewerage. As opposed to early
attributions of diarrhea to the cold winds, instances of sickness and diarrhea were begin
attributed to the sanitary conditions in which people were now living.

Photo 21 Using spring to do laundry (background) and mix pig slop (foreground). Upper slopes.
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Kari Kari
Questions about health often resulted in answers that veered towards mental and
emotional distress with very little mention of biological illnesses. During a conversation about
camp security, Veva, a mother of four, mentioned being unsettled by deaths in the camps. Veva
did not know an exact number of deaths, but would only describe it as hartos, or many. She
attributed some of the deaths to a Kari Kari. “A Kari Kari is a brujo who watches you from afar.
When you’re not paying attention, he’ll begin to steal your fat. He wants your grease, your fat”.
Veva’s oldest daughter chimed in. “So if you’re drunk and you pass out on the road, that’s where
they get you”. The symptoms that Veva described associated with the Kari Kari included a rapid
wasting, loss of energy, loss of weight, and loss of color until a person eventually died.
In attempting to discuss the nature of deaths in the displacement camps, one camp
administrator tallied the three deaths in the camp since he was placed in charge. “One man died
from old age. He had been sick for a while. Another, a woman, died after getting sick with
something really bad. Another, a younger man, died from the Kari Kari”. The camp
administrator was asked to elaborate on the Kari Kari. “Well, that’s what people say. He was
young and strong. I don’t think he had any health issues. But then he started to waste away”.
Later during the research period, a conversation with a young professor turned to local lore and
the Kari Kari. The professor at one point emphasized “The Kari Kari got me once! It feels as if it
draws away your life force until you die!” The exchange left the impression that the Kari Kari
and its associations with health are deeply entrenched in La Paz’s narratives of health and needs
further examination.
The results highlighted the complex nature of recovery and the avenues taken by
displaced residents in La Paz. While the semi-structured interviews provided some descriptive
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data, they also served to introduce the research to some of the social dynamics occurring in postdisaster slope areas and make acquaintances that allowed the research further access. As a result
much of the data is observed from the relations among different group members and the actions
of community factions. All of these had implications for post-disaster health, as was noted when
decisions made at the intra-community level, and enabled by municipal level decisions, exposed
community members to risks associated with lack of potable water and sanitation management.
The following section will provide analysis of the results and discuss in more detail the ways that
observed events reflect power struggles within a post-disaster community and affect post disaster
recovery in La Paz.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

The case of the La Paz megadeslizamiento contributes to growing anthropological
research focusing on post-disaster power dynamics and vulnerability by offering an account of
organized communities challenging the municipal government in their own post-disaster
recovery. While there are benefits to having an invested and active post-disaster community, the
case in La Paz illustrates how intra- and inter-barrio conflicts rooted in complex social, cultural,
and economic nuances can undermine long-term recovery. These findings are especially
interesting given the role that vulnerability plays in anthropological disaster research.
This chapter will address how the findings related to Research Aim 1 (what social,
cultural, economic or historic factors play roles in the process of initially settling and then
resettling post-disaster slope neighborhoods) have created hierarchies within the post-disaster
landscape that affect access to benefits or long-term recovery. The following sections will also
discuss how this research population’s activism revealed power relations at different societal
levels.
This chapter will also discuss the health needs of those returning to slope settlement
(Research Aim 2), but will do so with a focus on the convergence of initial settlement factors,
embedded sense of home/sense of place, post-disaster activism, and power relations that
appeared to create both immediate and long-term health implications in post-disaster Callapa.
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Research Aim 1-Contextualization
Population Profile
Respondents had various reasons for initially settling the disaster-affected slopes, with no
one reason emerging as a primary factor. Still, it should be noted that respondents’ motivations
stand in contrast to slope, or risk-prone, settlement. Initial settlement by comunarios was based
on the space available for grazing cattle and the warmer climate derived from being in the lee of
the mountain. Since then, settlement has largely been based on the search for space in the
densely populated city and the value of property that made the Kupini and Callapa slopes
attractive to residents of different socioeconomic statuses. All of the respondents reported being
from urban areas, often from La Paz, and in many cases from other parts of the same particular
mountain. La Paz is unique in that vulnerability tends to be skewed. Given the geologic
instability of La Paz, it is estimated that 500,000 of the city’s 800,000 residents live in the at-risk
slopes surrounding the city (Nathan 2008). Those living in at-risk areas are not limited to a
marginalized sub-segment, but include the urban poor, middle-class professionals and the
affluent.
This pattern lies in contrast to the much documented settlement of hazard-prone areas by
the urban poor (De Sherbinin, et al. 2007; Fan 2012; Fay 2005; Gencer 2007; Hardoy and
Pandiella 2009; Pielke Jr, et al. 2003; Sanderson 2000; Tibaijuka 2010; Zetter and Deikun 2010)
or as a direct result of rural-urban migration (Albuja and Ceballos 2010; Charvériat 2000a;
Guterres and Spiegel 2012; Guterres 2010; O'Hare and Rivas 2005; Wisner 2004). As a result of
the wide distribution of risk of landslides in La Paz, vulnerability in this case is most visibly
expressed in the landslide’s reconstruction and recovery processes where it has been noted that
power structures, social arrangements, cultural values and belief systems are often disclosed
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(Oliver-Smith 2002:29). So while efforts were made to minimize vulnerability and mitigate
disaster through various engineering initiatives (Municipal Government of La Paz 2011), efforts
to address vulnerability and mitigate disaster require an acknowledgement that affected groups
range in socioeconomic status and power, and thus may have different vested interests in the
post-disaster sociocultural landscape. Some of the divisions noted in La Paz are outlined below.
Social Distinctions and Hierarchies
Respondents from the Pampahasi-Callapa slope of La Paz varied in socioeconomic status,
livelihood, education and language. However, interviews revealed that displaced residents often
made distinctions and ascribed social positions based on two specific criteria: homeownership
status and land tenure. Homeownership was articulated as a conviction that those who owned
homes (propietarios) were more committed to the land and had more invested in the well-being
of the community than those who rented (inquilinos) and were thus loosely invested in the wellbeing of the community. Interviews also revealed secondary, morally-laden impressions of
homeownership in which owning a home was associated with fulfilling one’s responsibilities to
one’s family. Inquilinos were often regarded with suspicion for their state of transition. In
interviews, inquilinos were often referred to, both by homeowners and by inquilinos themselves,
as failures for not being able to provide a stable home for their families.
The second distinction that emerged was that of comunarios (1st wave settlers) and
vecinos (2nd wave and later). Comunarios were the first residents of the incorporated municipal
areas in the eastern slopes as part of the urban expansion of La Paz. They arrived at a time when
large lots of land could be bought or claimed. Comunarios tended to raise animals or engage in
small-scale agriculture. Comunarios primarily spoke Aymara and was often used among
comunarios to discuss issues among themselves during asambleas or to speak privately in the
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presence of mixed company. A sense of pride based on independence from modern luxuries and
the ability to survive with one’s own tools permeated the rhetoric of comunarios. In this way,
they often saw vecinos as being “soft”.
Vecinos were characterized as professionals that settled the Callapa slopes in the past
twenty years through the purchasing of lots from comunarios. They included middle-class
professionals, the urban poor, and affluent vacationers that owned homes in the area and shared
the common characteristic of not using animals or small-scale agriculture as a form of income or
sustenance. As a result, their homes were larger and on smaller lots than those who owned
livestock. Vecinos sought out the services of architects, engineers, surveyors, and lawyers in the
process of choosing a property, building a home, and settling disputes. This features in sharp
contrast to comunarios’ pattern of building without permission and challenging removal from
property, often through traditional means of dispute resolution.
These two distinctions, homeowners/renters and first wave/later wave settlement,
interacted to create a hierarchy of benefits and privileges that benefitted some while restricting
others. Within this framework (Figure 1), those with the least amount of power were RecentlyArrived Renters in the barrios. These residents had little presence or representation at community
asambleas as individuals and had less established networks. Recently-settled renters were less
likely to be parts of established coalitions; an important characteristic in a system where
community priorities were buoyed by the amount of vocal support it met at asambleas. This
systemic powerlessness was best illustrated by the inability for renters to benefit from any longterm post-landslide assistance while not being sufficiently organized as a group to pressure
government officials.
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Examples of this can be seen in the experiences described by Hector. As a renter in the
upper slopes who lost his work tools and was left homeless by the landslide, Hector and his wife
described the difficulty in finding a person that will rent to a family with multiple children (who
landlords see as a liability to their properties). Any compensation for losses will go to Hector’s
landlord, who, despite living way from the slopes, is still documented as suffering a loss of
home. Similarly, the woman in the Callapa camp attempting to remove her home was confronted
by propietarios and kept from taking it, as propietarios illegally dismantled their own shelters.
As a group, renters were not organized to make demands or make their grievances public, as was
the case with propietarios. So as renters had little status to receive benefits, they also had little
power to change the outcome of their situation.
Some residents of the affected slopes were recently settled homeowners. Homeowners
held the prestige of having established roots in the area, while having reduced power due to their
recent arrival or the “depth” of said roots, as it were. Yolanda, a homeowner and a vecino (recent
settler), was a member of the community junta. However, Yolanda admits that even though she
purchased the property and erected 12 foot walls, comunarios (original landowners) still feel
they should have access to her property. Yolando describes comunarios often climbing over her
wall to dig ditches through her yard without her permission and challenging her authority to
block them from accessing her property. More dramatic was the example of a vecina woman at
the asamblea noted above, who saw comunarios building a wall on her property. When the
woman challenged their encroachment into her property, she was met with machetes and threats
to her family. The woman brought the grievance to the asamblea, where the event was confirmed
but where the vecinos appeals and threat of legal action was met by the inevitability of
construction and community ambivalence for her situation.
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Comunarios who were also renters were less common. In these cases, comunarios would
rent rooms in nearby neighborhoods until their properties became safe to inhabit or while
reconstruction commenced. This research observed that renting comunarios were given the
deference afforded to long-time residents in the area. However, as renters their issues were not
considered immediate enough to warrant any action at asambleas or at the community level. So
while they had high social status in the affected areas, they suffered from low, albeit temporary,
power.
Highest in this stratified framework were people who were both comunarios and
homeowners. As comunarios, they received the respect afforded to long-term residents and were
often the loudest to speak in asambleas. As a solidified coalition, home-owning comunarios
often stood together and were vocal about any measures they considered could affect them. A
popular position among this group was that original property lines be respected, despite land
having shifted or even disappearing, and even if it meant the property line crossed proposed sites
for roads and utilities. Such was the power of comunarios that community asambleas appeared
to have little effect on their interests, as it was widely reported that they held their own
asambleas at night or in comunarios homes. This was best exemplified by the message from
comunarios that the displacement camp was to close within three days or it would be burned to
the ground. Despite the extra-judicial implications of the demands, the displacement camp closed
and no legal action was pursued.
The social distinctions identified above mirror assertions that the recovery and
reconstruction phases of disasters can often make visible hidden features in a community,
including power structures, social arrangements, hierarchies, and conflicts (Button 2010; Fassin
and Vasquez 2005; Oliver-Smith 2002).
87

Observed Social Distinctions in Disasted Affected
Communities

Propietario

High Social
Status/Low
Power

High Social
Status/High
Power

Inquilino

Low Social
Status/Low
Power

Low Social
Status/High
Power

Vecino

Comunario

Figure 3: Observed social distinctions

However they also resonate with literature critiquing reconstruction as becoming a setting
for the contestation of political power and reinforcing existing divisions (Anderson and
Woodrow 1989; Lyons 2009; Oliver-Smith 1996). Indeed, the competition for post-disaster
resources made implicit relationships between different groups explicit, best illustrated in the
divisions between comunarios and vecinos. By respondents’ accounts, vecinos acknowledged
that comunarios held significant influence over local events, would sometimes hold clandestine
asambleas, and were capable of following through on threats to dynamite water lines to the Zona
Sur of La Paz. Still, the community junta consisted primariy of vecinos. This junta was in
communication with municipal officials regarding long-term recovery and help influence in
dictating agendas for the community. This arrangement in which vecinos held some control over
community resources and agendas represented a change to the status quo where comunarios
dictated events. Comunarios pushed back, as was illustrated in the deliberate challenging of
instructions set forth by the municipal government through the community junta. The deliberate
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building of walls over others’ property lines, the use of intimidation, and later threats to the
Callapa displacement camp in opposition to municipal and junta plans represented a
reestablishment of the status quo for comunarios and wrested any semblance of control from
external parties. More importantly, comunarios demonstrated the politics of representation in
disaster by unilaterally ending a chapter of aid in Callapa regardless of the needs of hundreds of
families. In doing so, they cemented their influence over post-disaster Callapa.
Post-Disaster Activism
Of great relevance to this research are issues of power. Community organization,
emerging in response to specific circumstances on the ground, helped to illuminate the dynamics
of social power in post-disaster Callapa. Community organizations in Callapa and the
community junta in Villa Salome held significantly more influence over local events than
municipal or state actors. This may be intentional, as the government of Bolivia has taken a
position that communities should be active in their community’s affairs. Competitions seeking
the “barrio de verdad” [true barrio] or the best all-around neighborhood in La Paz encouraged the
formation of neighborhood organizations and community pride. Indeed, municipal staff in postdisaster Callapa explicitly stated their desire that Callapa identify, problematize, and solve its
own issues.
Community juntas exist across La Paz with varying degrees of autonomy. The
community junta in the Villa Salome Barrio endeavored to build a school in its neighborhood
with very little municipal intervention. The same junta in Villa Salome held the camp
administrator accountable for unclear eviction timelines, while the GAMLP administrator
acknowledged the junta’s community representation as valid and meriting deference. This kind
of acknowledgment of community authority is also seen in the gesture EPSAS (municipal water
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company executives) extended to community leaders at the demonstration of July 1st of allowing
a group of twelve into executive offices to review reconstruction plans.
However, despite the junta’s “formal” authority in Callapa, power was negotiated
between original, mainly agricultural, mostly Aymara speaking landowners (comunarios) and
newer, mostly urban, professionals (vecinos) with larger homes. This negotiation was tense and
was characterized by intimidation and forced claims. Frustrated with the slow return to properties
and with the potential of losing the soccer field to city use, the comunarios wrested power from
the junta and established its own terms that, while not approved by the GAMLP, was ultimately
accepted.
The affected communities’ active and organized political engagement, resistance to
government decisions, and ensuing conflicts creates many questions at the intersection of
community risk and state responsibility. Currently, people living in the slopes surrounding La
Paz need basic services because they live in areas where infrastructure has been damaged.
Meanwhile, the GAMLP cannot provide these services because property issues are obstructing
construction and people have settled unstable and at-risk slope areas. At the time of this writing,
these two positions have yet to be reconciled.
Meanwhile in the upper slopes, the meeting between the community junta of Villa
Salome and the camp administrator Ramon further illustrated the growing tensions between
displacement camps and host communities. While that is not wholly unexpected, the influence
that neighborhoods in La Paz held as organized groups with functioning committees and the
deference that was afforded to them by municipal authorities formed a power relationship in
which the organized members of communities could legitimately pressure government actors
during recovery. This was often manifested as demonstrations to the Mayor’s office,
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demonstrations on the major boulevard in downtown La Paz and meetings with municipal
leaders. Unfortunately, the lack of organization on the part of those displaced from the upper
slopes meant there was no organized effort to clarify policy, seek benefits that were promised or
challenge a closure schedule that was going to leave them homeless. In Villa Salome, external
community mobilizations were challenging the existence of a displacement camp that was
occupying an important community space (soccer field).
The way that power is expressed at the community and municipal levels warrants
examination through the lens of political economy. It is important to recognize that intra- and
inter- barrio conflicts and their positioning vis-à-vis municipal actors exists within an established
social framework. Threats to dynamite water lines, burn down camps, and shut down water
departments would suggest that post-disaster Callapa adopted the role extra-judicial agitators.
However, the role of the same junta in policing camp residents, mediating grievances,
communicating with municipal officials and working to plan out the next iteration of Callapa
suggests an assistive role in post-disaster communities. In this light, the actions of post-disaster
neighborhoods in protecting their interests, how these actions are buoyed by a national campaign
of populist messages encouraging that citizens organize and take a vested role in their
communities, along with the tacit acceptance by municipal officials of community actions all
together suggest a more active role of community juntas as unofficial proxies of state authority.
So while demonstrations expressing displeasure with authorities was common, they
played within a national strategy that itself was rooted in a history of struggle, insurgency and
activism. This resulted in communities adopting the burden of civic responsibilities in the
absence of municipal reach. Having a municipal camp administrator show me a water bill for a
displacement camp and state, “we can’t pay for this water anymore” while seeing the community
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junta in Callapa collect payment from residents for the collective water bill was striking. The
juxtaposition further cemented the idea rooted in political economy that widely disseminated
populist messages of Evo Morales’ administration in 2013 manifested on the ground as a strategy
by which authorities could maintain power by engaging ideological focus on community welfare
and placing municipal and civic responsibilities on stakeholders where municipal authority was
unable or unwilling to intervene. Within this framework, the absence of municipal authority in
post-disastter zones or in the affairs of communities is not a failure of the state, but is reframed
as a token of empowerment and agency where angry demonstrations are useful expressions of
community solidarity.
Research Aim 2-Health
There are indications that the extended displacement and the conditions in the camps
affected mental health more than any notable self-reported biological illnesses among those
affected by the landslide. This was caused in large part by the uncertainty of their situations and
the interpersonal tensions within the camp. Questions of health often veered towards descriptions
of stress, shame, and sadness at not being able to provide a better life for one’s children. Within
the camps, physical altercations and tensions also contributed to the anguish felt by respondents.
Mental health falls is an important but often neglected area of public health and can be
deeply affected by disaster. While mental health can be sometimes given the appearance of being
intangible and nebulous, chronic stressors can be embodied in health through compromised
immune systems and susceptibility. Systemic inequalities can be embodied in human biology
through the biological responses to stressors allostasis while prolonged and chronic exposures to
systemic stressors can lead to dysfunction or allostatic overload. (Gravlee 2009; McEwen 2004).
This embodiment of chronic environmental and social stressors can impact immune functions
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and have damaging effects on circulatory, nervous, and metabolic systems (McEwen 2004). So
while the applicability of psychological scales or metrics on non-industrialized populations
continues to be an ongoing debate, this paper acknowledges that chronic stress and related
reactions to disaster such as concern over livelihoods and sustenance is salient when discussing
mental health in the context of disaster.
Stress in post-disaster displacement is well documented, but shares certain parallels with
a nearby case in Ecuador where residents needed to be evacuated from the slopes of an active
volcano. Those evacuated from the slopes of Mount Tungurahua often remarked on the stresses
of having to leave their homes, live in new host communities, and re-think their livelihood.
Resettled residents lived with the reports that soldiers were stealing their animals, an economic
unit as much as a type of sustenance, as well living in their homes (Tobin and Whiteford 2002).
While not overtly a medical mental health issue, it speaks to the ongoing stresses felt by
residents on how they were going to maintain their families when their economic livelihood
based on agriculture and livestock was threatened. The anxiety associated with uncertainty after
disaster also featured prominently in focus groups where residents expressed that they had bills
to pay, that they were not sure how they were going to feed their children, and did not have a
sense of knowing the outcome of recent events (Tobin and Whiteford 2001). This is accentuated
by the sense of isolation some residents felt away from home. As families had to evacuate
quickly and sometimes without each other, many families found themselves fragmented.
While distrust in itself cannot be considered pathological, it contributes to a sense of
insecurity. It is worth noting that a sense of distrust of the government emerged out of the
military-driven evacuation and the forced retaking of sections of the faldas by former residents
(Tobin and Whiteford 2001) rings similar to the community driven retaking of damaged slope
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neighborhoods in La Paz, despite explicit municipal bans on doing so. Moving forward, this
distrust in government actors should be taken into account when developing evacuation plans or
risk communications to maximize its effectiveness.
In addition to mental health, the forced evacuation of camps in the slopes of Callapa
allowed for the development of new health risks not seen when populations were being provided
with potable water, sanitary facilities, and gas for cooking. New conditions resulted in the use of
contaminated water, lack of proper sewerage, and the lack of gas, firewood or coals to spare for
water sterilization. While respondents began to report stomach pains, diarrhea and body aches in
the weeks following the forced evacuation, it should be noted that exposure to such conditions
again crossed different economic and social strata.
Recommendations
In La Paz, where the availability of space places the majority of the population at risk of
landslides (Nathan 2008), averting risk may not be an option. Indeed, the perception of risk by
those in vulnerable situations is often relative and needs critical exploration (Button 2010;
Oliver-Smith 1999). In La Paz, Nathan (2008) finds that residents of even the most risky of
locations were more concerned about their ability to eat or more worried about street violence
than about the stability of their home. In addition, the author found that he must gain significant
trust of people before they would admit to that a wall inside their home had fallen or that there
were structural problems (Nathan 2008 p. 346).
Thus, while it is clear that many people live at risk, that space is limited, and that
prohibition of dangerous settlement will continue, one possibility that emerges for mitigation and
prevention efforts would be increased awareness. Recognizing that settlement in these areas will
continue, a campaign that informs residents of warning signs but also helps to ease the stigma
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associated with a structurally unsound home could be effective in helping to prevent casualties.
Given that La Paz already has teams mobilized throughout the city through DEGIR, this
campaign could conceivably be a deciding linkage between the population and emergency
personnel.
One idea that could be explored would be the use of disaster insurance. A pilot program
instituted in Manizales, Colombia, featured insurance for lower-income populations paid through
municipal taxes. Once 30% of an area has paid into the insurance, the entire at risk community
was covered (Fay 2005). While the effectiveness of the program in Manizales is yet to be seen, it
would be a useful tool in an area where not building on risk-prone areas is not an option, where
alert programs are already in place, and where mitigation efforts are progressing. The program in
Manizales was geared towards the city’s poor who, as noted, are more vulnerable to hazards due
to the stability of their homes and the precariousness of their access to resources (Breckjord, et
al. 2012; Ingram, et al. 2006; Perry and Lindell 2006). Still, expansion of the program to a
broader socioeconomic group in La Paz could be a worthy addition to the city’s emergency
management landscape. As the upper slopes and the lower slopes faced two different disaster
experiences with two decidedly different outcomes, it is important to understand that any
recommendations speaking to this or similar events address two different scenarios: 1) relocation
to new settlement and 2) resettlement of the disaster area.
In the following section, I present specific recommendations for these two scenarios.
Relocation
1. Include displaced persons in resettlement discussion. La Paz has proven to have
highly organized and involved community organizations with access to deputy mayors,
government offices, and municipal officials. However, municipal representatives and
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displaced residents agreed that no consultations were made when deciding the location of
where to send displaced persons.
2. Make plans readily accessible and disseminate to displaced population. Even as
camp closures loomed, displaced residents were not typically aware of what assistance
they would be receiving from the municipal or central governments. Often, respondents
would report being on a “waiting list” for benefits (property, land) that municipal
authorities would confirm later did not exist. Some respondents, primarily renters, would
also believe that they were entitled to benefits that municipal authorities would later
confirm were not available to them. As camp residents and community asambleas offer a
venue for receptive audiences, periodic presence of authorities with information about
entitlements to benefits would alleviate some of the uncertainty and stresses felt by the
affected populations.
3. Provide transition support. Residents that qualified for relocation to El Alto were
hesitant for a variety of reasons, including those associated with changes in weather,
livelihood, and perceptions of El Alto as disorganized and crime-ridden. Increased
transition assistance marked by pre-relocation meetings, coordination with host
community authorities, and periodic follow-up could ameliorate some of the stresses
associated with relocation.
Resettlement
1. Work closely with local power structures. The municipal government of La Paz
worked closely with the Callapa community junta. However, the research revealed that
the junta was made up of vecinos, while comunarios as a group held significant influence
over local events and agendas. Municipal officials would benefit from identifying the
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nuances of community influence and working with all groups involved on long-term
recovery goals.
2. Provide guidance in re-planning and surveying. In an attempt to allow communities to
be engaged in their own recovery, municipal officials in La Paz allowed residents of
Callapa to develop the new community plan complete with roads and property lines. This
created property disputes and uncertainty about the legitimacy of proposed surveying
methods. Should property lines be based on where they stood relative to other landmarks?
By GPS? Should residents still be entitled to the same amount of square footage when
some properties were pushed into the river? These questions were left to be resolved at
the junta level, an organizational structure wholly unqualified for the task and with no
authority to enforce uncooperative construction. The community of Callapa would
benefit from more guidance from the municipal government on post-disaster precedents,
planning and input. Additionally, the municipal government’s enforcement of unlawful
and obstructive construction would discourage rampant construction being used as a
claim to land.
3. Provide protections to property rights. As noted above, construction in some instances
became a method of marking territory under the assumption that once a wall or home was
built it would be difficult to challenge the claim. Municipal inaction reinforced this
notion and provoked disputes between residents of Callapa. In addition to providing
guidance and community planning, municipal officials should be able to protect the
property rights of residents once a plan has been established and approved and enforce
the bans to not build structures until a final plan has been agreed upon.

97

Directions for Future Research
The effects of the landslide and the circumstances surrounding recovery highlighted both
social and health-related topics worth exploring in La Paz. Future research should seek to better
understand community power relations vis-à-vis adjacent communities and the municipal
government in a post-disaster context as Callapa continues to recover, but also those of
communities in non-affected risk areas. Specific to Callapa, research should focus on the
continued health of the population given the lack of adequate access to potable water and the
emergence of gastrointestinal distress.
Broadly, future research should endeavor to further examine 1) the merits and obstacles
of community engagement in post-disaster recovery and 2) the role of activism at the intersection
of long-term civic responsibility and individual conceptions of land rights and right to home. In
addition, future research should attempt a macro view of government disaster interventions and
the role of communities within a broader geo-political structure to understand how broader
national policies enable community driven disaster recovery efforts.
Limitations
There are several limitations to the study. One primary limitation was distance between
camps and the disaster site. While the target research population consisted of those displaced by
the landslide, the research sites were six camps and one surviving community in the damaged
slopes. This limited the amount of interaction and observations that could occur at any one
location. Moreover, simmering tensions that were openly manifesting in the Callapa camp and
lower slopes required more of my attention and time than some of the other camps. So while
much information was gathered from the Callapa camp by virtue of the situation occurring on the

98

ground, it drew away from participation and observation in some of the other camps, most
notably the Zenobio Lopez Camps I and II.
A second limitation was the small sample size for a current displaced population
estimated at between 2,000 and 4,000 people. As such, the respondents’ data was not enough to
perform statistical analysis or draw statistical conclusions. However, a strength of the research
lay in the many informal and unstructured interviews, as well as the participant observation of
community events. The responses received encompassed the different groups that residents selfidentified as existing in their own communities and provided insight about the different and
nuanced experiences of the 2011 landslide. Their contributions add richness and extra
dimensions to the traditional post-disaster binary of “those affected” and “those not affected”.
A third limitation was the inability to live in Callapa proper or in the displacement camps.
Callapa currently has homes that are in different states of disrepair, with families unable to
accommodate guests. The trust required to accommodate a foreigner was also initially absent as
prearranged contacts in the area became unresponsive to communications. Without a proper
introduction, I was initially regarded with suspicion and hampered any early negotiation of
homestay or rental arrangements. Secondly, as Callapa and its associated nearby displacement
camp were one of six sites that needed to be visited, it was important to be near intersections
with regular access to numerous modes of public transportation and routes; characteristics that
were absent in Callapa. Attempts to stay in a displacement camp shelter also proved
challenging. As camp residents found permanent housing solutions, shelters were disassembled
and either signed over to the family or returned to the donor organization. As a result, all shelters
that were standing from June to August 2013 were full, with many housing two families
averaging five members apiece. I considered any attempts to stay in these inappropriate for the
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people that were already living tightly and would have to uncomfortably accommodate one more
person. Instead I opted to live in the nearby Irpavi/Obrajes neighborhood that afforded easy
access to not only Callapa, but to the six displacement camps, downtown municipal offices and a
local university that was offering its support to the research. As such, full participant observation
is limited by the inability to completely stay in the affected area or camps.
A fourth limitation of the study was its reliance on the municipal government for access
to displacement camps. Initial meetings in the displacement camps were marked by municipal
oversight with municipal authorities present. Thus, it is possible that displaced residents could
have seen this research as an extension of municipal interests. This could have created a response
bias based on respondents either not wanting to risk post-disaster benefits based on what was
said, or scared to criticize government officials charged with their housing in the camps. While
the research revealed an established sentiment of open critical dialogue and varied critiques and
compliments for the municipal government, it cannot be discounted that any errors in associating
this research with the municipal government could have skewed not only those that agreed to
respond, but their responses. Every effort was made to ensure respondents understood their
responses were confidential and that the research was independent of any municipal influence.
A fifth limitation of the research was the self-reported nature of the data. Respondents
provided demographic information, their experiences with the disaster, post-disaster recovery,
and their own health largely based on symptomatic and somatic experiences. To the extent
possible, these experiences were triangulated with ethnographic observations, accounts of others,
and municipal data, if available, for internal validity. However, asymptomatic health issues or
evidence of biomedical disease was impossible to collect given the scope of the research.
Similarly, as respondents joked about providing false income data to sociologists in previous
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research, this research dropped questions of income in favor of employment status and
employment category (agriculture, construction, manual labor, professionalized labor). Attempts
were made to verify information through further probing and follow-up.
Lastly, the research site and the circumstances surrounding them had unique
characteristics based on community leadership, informal social arrangements, and specific
factors related to water and land rights. While some information from this study can be used as a
case study in future disaster events, it should not be construed that recommendations made by
this research or that the data can be generalizable to all incidents of urban landslides or incidents
of urban displacement.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

For some, the return to at-risk slope properties was supported by entrenched cultural and
social meanings attached to land and home ownership. For others, land and homes were a
significant personal and financial investment that needed to be protected throughout the recovery
process from external land claims, interlopers, and government restrictions. The desire to reclaim
home resulted in hundreds of families living with limited critical services in order to stay on or
near damaged property. Community mobilization, spurred by competition for resources at
multiple levels, emerged as an important factor in the post-disaster recovery process of Callapa
and surrounding areas. While scarcity of resources galvanized communities to pressure
authorities with demonstrations and threats, it also created internal conflicts between
homeowners (propietarios), renters (inquilinos), older-settled agricultural landowners
(comunarios) and newly-settled, lot-owning professionals (vecinos) over entitlement to water,
property, and post-disaster benefits. Competition for community spaces spurred the mobilization
of host communities to reclaim, sometimes violently, the culturally and symbolically-laden
soccer field on which the displacement camps were located.
The informal social arrangement in which the GAMLP granted authority to community
juntas allowed local actors to influence long-term disaster recovery in significant ways.
However, this delegation of responsibility without acknowledging intra-barrio frictions or
anticipating community opposition to municipal plans ultimately disrupted reconstruction,
strained existing infrastructure capabilities, and threatened to undermine community health.
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The people affected by the landslide of La Paz demonstrated an amazing perseverance in
their pursuit to regain their lands or redress for losses. Since the landslide, residents proudly
point to the successfully pressuring of local officials into reinstalling electricity and sparing their
children from doing homework under the street lamps of neighboring barrios. They proudly point
to the cracks they have patched and to the little improvisations accomplished to overcome
common issues. A water hose, linked many times over, extended from the top of the slope down
into some of the damaged properties providing minimal water but water nonetheless.
It was rare to find a respondent without a smile, even when discussing misfortunes. The
optimism continued into post-camp life. After fleeing the Callapa camp due to threats, Flor
assembled a makeshift fence around what she thinks is her property. At the center is her old
shelter from the camp, relocated onto a spot directly below the face of the slope. She has
flowering bushes near the fence and a piece of plywood rigged to be a door into her yard. When
asked if she was worried to live so near to the landslide area Flor joked, “For years, I wanted to
get more sun in my yard. After that part right there fell, now I get all the sun I always wanted”
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